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THE SCOPE OF THE RIGHT TO MEANINGFUL
ACCESS AND THE DEFENSE OF UNDUE
BURDENS UNDER DISABILITY CIVIL
RIGHTS LAWS
Timothy M. Cook*
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 19731 facially prohibits any
exclusion of handicapped persons by reason of a handicap "from the par-
ticipation in . . . any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance or... any program or activity conducted by any Executive
agency" as well as any "deni[al of] the benefits of" any such program or
activity, and any "discrimination" in such programs.2 Following enact-
ment of section 504, the lead agencies responsible for enforcing that
law-initially the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(HEW), and then the Department of Justice-and numerous other agen-
cies as well, promulgated regulations that permitted burdens to be taken
into account in rendering programs accessible to handicapped persons, so
long as the disabled community was able to effectively and meaningfully
participate in those programs.3
These regulations were based on lengthy administrative records that
supported this approach and accumulated evidence that the cost of pro-
viding effective access to handicapped persons was exaggerated and that
the benefits to disabled people, both pecuniary and nonpecuniary, out-
* Attorney, Disabilities Project, Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia. B.A. 1975,
J.D. 1978, University of Pennsylvania.
1. 29 U.S.C. § 794 0985).
2. Section 504 provides in pertinent part:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined
in section 706(7) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program
or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.
The head of each such agency shall promulgate such regulations as may be necessary
to carry out the amendments to this section made by the Rehabilitation, Comprehen-
sive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Act of 1978.
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1985). The emphasized portion of the statute was added by § 119 of the
Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-602, § 119, 92 Stat. 2982 (1978).
3. See infra notes 64-96, 150-58 and accompanying text.
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weighed the costs. In 1984, however, the Department of Justice promul-
gated a new regulation4 adopting general waiver provisions that
eliminated the duty to take "any action" in situations that "would result
... in undue financial and administrative burdens."'5 As justification for
the action, the Department of Justice stated its belief that judicial inter-
pretation of section 504 compelled it to incorporate the new language.
This Article will evaluate these varying approaches, codified in fed-
eral regulations, to determine which approach more closely honors Con-
gress' purpose in enacting section 504. It will also evaluate the findings
made by the federal agencies during their promulgation of those rules
enforcing that law. The Article will then address the declarations of the
Supreme Court in Alexander v. Choate,7 and other decisions that have
acknowledged the duty to provide disabled persons "meaningful access"
to federal and federally assisted programs.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION
504's MEANINGFUL ACCESS REQUIREMENT
In evaluating the agencies' constructions of the duty to provide
meaningful access embodied in section 504, it is important to consider
any "ascertainable" legislative intent to discern Congress' purpose in en-
acting and amending that section.8 This is necessary to insure that "the
agency properly construes its statutory obligations, and that the policies
it adopts and implements are consistent with those duties and not a nega-
tion of them."9 An agency must always ascertain whether the will of
Congress has been obeyed. 10
4. 28 C.F.R. §§ 39.101-39.170 (1984).
5. Id. §§ 39.150(a), 39.160(d).
6. 49 Fed. Reg. 35,725 (1984).
7. 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985).
8. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
9. Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1163-64 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
10. Cf INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 n.16 (1983) (citing Yakus v. United States, 321
U.S. 414, 425 (1941)). The propriety of administration actions concerning disability rights are
to be reviewed in light of the well-settled principle of statutory construction that civil rights
laws be liberally construed in order that their beneficent objectives may be realized to the
fullest extent possible. Section 504 was intended to be "a 'bill of rights' for the handicapped."
119 CONG. REc. 7105 (1973) (statement of Rep. Peyser). During the debates on the 1978
amendments to § 504, Senator Stafford referred to that law as "the base line civil rights provi-
sion for handicapped Americans." 124 CONG. Rc. 30,328 (1978). "As is apparent from its
language, Section 504 is intended to be part of the general corpus of discrimination law." New
York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644, 649 (2d Cir. 1979). Accord-
ing to Professor Sutherland:
There has now come to be widespread agreement, however, that civil rights acts are
remedial and should be liberally construed in order that their beneficent objectives
may be realized to the fullest extent possible. To this end, courts favor broad and
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A. The Original Enactment of Section 504
The legislative history of section 504 as originally enacted11 suggests
three propositions: First, Congress was concerned about the exclusion of
handicapped persons from federally financed programs, especially se-
verely handicapped persons. Second, Congress identified architectural
and communication barriers as a central cause of that exclusion. Third,
Congress determined that the elimination of those barriers would entail
costs and burdens, but indicated that the costs of exclusion-in both
human and economic terms-were the greater evil.
The evil that section 504 was initially intended to eliminate was the
exclusion of handicapped persons from federal and federally assisted pro-
grams so that they may benefit from services available to the general pub-
lic. In introducing the bill, Representative Vanik stated, "regard for the
rights of handicapped citizens in our country is one of America's shame-
inclusive application of statutory language by which the coverage of legislation to
protect and implement civil rights is defined. This policy has found application in
determining such questions as, for example, what activities or circumstances were
subject to a prohibition against discrimination, what persons were protected against
discrimination, and what constitutes a violation. Correlatively, exceptions and limi-
tations which restrict the operation of such laws are strictly construed.
3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 72.05, at 392 (C. Sands 4th
ed. 1974); see also County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 178 (1981); Cannon v. Univer-
sity of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979). Like Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972,20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1982), whose language it tracks, § 504 is to be accorded "'a sweep as
broad as its language."' North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982) (quoting
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966)). Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d (1982), the language of which § 504 also copies, "is majestic in its sweep," Board of
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 284 (1978), and "is unequivocal, broad,
and remedial in nature." NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, 599 F.2d 1247, 1251 (3d
Cir. 1979); cf S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 347 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1030
(1981) ("section 504, as [a] remedial statute, should be broadly applied and liberally construed
in favor of providing a free and appropriate education to handicapped students"). As one
court of appeals has recently observed, "the intent of Congress matched the broad sweep of
[§ 504's] language." Le Strange v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 687 F.2d 767, 774 (3d Cir. 1982),
aff'd, 465 U.S. 624 (1984).
11. Section 504 originated in bills introduced by Representative Vanik in the House of
Representatives and Senators Humphrey and Percy in the Senate to amend Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include handicap among the classes protected by that Act. Con-
gress included the language of those bills in three different versions of the Rehabilitation Acts
of 1972 and 1973 (the first two versions were vetoed), carrying through the intent of those bills.
See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 n.13 (1985). Senators Humphrey and Percy and
Representative Vanik expressed the understanding that § 504 would effectuate the intent of
their original bills. 118 CONG. REc. 32,310 (1972) (statement of Sen. Humphrey); 119 CONG.
REC. 6497 (1973) (statement of Sen. Percy); 119 CONG. REC. 18,137 (1973) (statement of Rep.
Vanik). A unanimous Supreme Court determined that the views of Congressman Vanik and
Senators Humphrey and Percy are to be given particular weight in interpreting the legislative
history of § 504. Alexander, 469 U.S. at 295 n.13, 296 n.15. See also School Bd. v. Arline, 107
S. Ct. 1123, 1126 & n.2, 1128 & n.9 (1987).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:1471
ful oversights .... The handicapped are... hidden .... Only the most
daring and brave risk the dangers and suffer the humiliations they en-
counter .... But the time has come when we can no longer tolerate
[their] invisibility."
12
Senator Humphrey, explaining the need and purposes behind the
bill, noted that "no longer dare we live with the hypocrisy that the prom-
ise of America should have one major exception: millions of children,
youth, and adults with mental and physical handicaps. We must now
firmly establish their right to share that promise .... I am insisting that
the civil rights of 40 million Americans now be affirmed and effectively
guaranteed by Congress." 13
As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Alexander v. Choate,14 sec-
tion 504 was designed by its sponsors to launch "a national commitment
to eliminate the 'glaring neglect' of the handicapped,"15 "which caused
[them] ... to live among society 'shunted aside, hidden, and ignored.' "I
"In essence," Senator Percy stressed, "our amendment will give the
handicapped their rightful place in society." 17 Senator Humphrey re-
marked that the bill would "firmly establish the right of these Americans
to dignity and self-respect as equal and contributing members of society,
and to end the virtual isolation of millions of children and adults from
society."18
Congress was mindful not only of the mildly or moderately disabled,
but also of those with severe disabilities. Congressman Vanik and Sena-
tors Humphrey and Percy each focused upon "the most severely handi-
capped."1 9 Handicapped persons who, because of inaccessible programs
and services, had been forced to stay "behind closed doors,"'20 "the 'ex-
pendables,'" as Senator Humphrey described them, 21 were the primary
intended beneficiaries of section 504.22 The "tragically overdue goal"
12. 117 CONG. Rac. 45,974 (1971).
13. 118 CONG. REc. 525, 526 (1972).
14. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
15. Id. at 296 (quoting 118 CONG. Rnc. 526 (1972) (statement of Sen. Percy)).
16. Id. (quoting 117 CONG. REc. 45,974 (1971) (statement of Rep. Vanik)).
17. 118 ONG. Rac. 526 (1972).
18. Id. at 32,310.
19. 117 CONG. REc. 45,974 (1971); see 118 CoNG. Rac. 526, 32,310 (1972).
20. 117 CONG. Ra-c. 45,974 (1971) (statement of Rep. Vanik).
21. 118 CONG. REc. 9495 (1972).
22. See 119 CONG. REc. 24,588 (1973) (statement of Sen. Williams). In the Rehabilitation
Act, into which Congress inserted § 504, Congress required that vocational-rehabilitation
"serv[es]first those with the most severe handicaps." 29 U.S.C. § 721(a)(5)(A) (1982) (empha-
sis added); see also id. §§ 741(a), 762(a), 772(b)(1), 774(b).
Thus, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) announced when he issued
his regulation for § 504 that he would "give particular attention in [his] enforcement of section
1474
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was the "full integration of the handicapped into normal community liv-
ing, working, and service patterns."23
The sponsors focused on the causes of exclusion and concluded that
prime among them were architectural and communications barriers. Ac-
cording to Senator Humphrey, section 504 was necessary because of the
"problems of transportation and architectural barriers."'24 He insisted
that these barriers be eliminated, otherwise "the injustice of exclusion
remains."" Similarly, Representative Seymour shared with Congress a
letter from a disabled constituent26 complaining of the barriers to enjoy-
ment of the normal benefits of citizenship caused by the inaccessibility of
government programs. While discussing his version of the bill that even-
tually became section 504, Representative Seymour concluded:
Only recently have we made any kind of an effort to construct
ramps allowing handicapped persons to enter public buildings.
Time and again, however, the handicapped person finds that he
cannot enter a building because there are too many stairs, or
the door is too heavy to open by himself. He finds that public
telephones and drinking fountains are too high for him to use
from his wheelchair, or that the doors to public restrooms are
not wide enough for his wheelchair to pass through....
It is because this long roilcall of discrimination against the
handicapped has existed for too long that I am sponsoring an
amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to specifically in-
clude the handicapped.27
Likewise, Senator Kennedy stated that the law would open up "new ave-
nues of opportunity to millions of handicapped Americans" and remove
"unnecessary obstacles from their path; obstacles sich as discrimination
in Federal employment, obstacles such as architectural barriers .... All
of these barriers have prevented the handicapped from obtaining employ-
504 to eliminating discrimination against persons with the severe handicaps that were the fo-
cus of concern in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973." 42 Fed. Reg. 22,686 (1977).
23. 118 CONG. REc. 3320 (1972) (statement of Sen. Williams) (emphasis added).
24. 118 CONG. RFC. 525 (1972).
25. Id.
26. The letter stated:
The disabled cannot petition the government except by letter since most public
buildings have no access ways for them. A wheelchair or a person on crutches can-
not go up those steps. The City Council and City Hall are off limits to the disabled.
I know because I tried, [sic] to see Mayor Lindsey on the few times that he stayed in
New York. I was later told that there is a back entrance that nobody knows about
and by the way the same is true of the building in which Congress meets.
118 CONG. REC. 10,326 (1972).
27. Id.
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ment, from attending school, even from voting."2 8  Numerous other
members of Congress, in addition to the committee report on the bill,
agreed.2 9
The legislative history also articulates Congress' expectation that
although accessibility would entail burdens, eliminating the evil of exclu-
sion would economically and morally outweigh the costs. Congress
knew that the success and effectiveness of the vocational services provi-
sions of Title I of the Rehabilitation Act30 depended upon enabling hand-
icapped people to go to work, to contribute to the gross national product
and the tax coffers, and to participate in the life of the community as
well.3 In hearings before the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, testimony was presented indicating that "[s]uch problems as...
difficulties of access to places of work and treatment centers.., were
voiced repeatedly .... The expenditure of money on vocational rehabili-
tation programs is not well spent if we do not at the same time take
meaningful steps to eliminate architectural barriers."32 Senator Taft, a
sponsor of the Rehabilitation Act, agreed:
[I]f we are to assure that all handicapped persons may partici-
pate fully in the rewards made possible by the vocational reha-
bilitation program, we must devote more of our energy toward
elimination of the most disgraceful barrier of all-
discrimination....
... The measure before us today provides that opportunity
on a sound and positive basis so that our Nation's handicapped
28. 119 CONG. REC. 10,820 (1973).
29. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2076, 2078; 119 CoNG. REc. 17,347 (1973) (statement of Rep. Pat-
ten); 119 CONG. REc. 24,588 (statement of Sen. Williams); 119 CONG. REC. 15,331 (statement
of Rep. Culver). Senator Williams also made clear the intention to address, for deaf persons,
"[d]iscrimination in access to... public communication facilities because they cannot make
use of more normal modes." 118 CONG. REc. 3320 (1972). Moreover, on the same day it
considered § 504, the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare reported that handi-
capped individuals often were "denied access to transportation, buildings, and housing because
of architectural barriers." S. REP. No. 319, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1973). Aware that "tech-
nology exists which would enable many who are handicapped to take advantage of existing
transportation, communication, and educational systems," the Committee indicated its under-
standing that this area had been addressed in the Rehabilitation Act and stated its belief that
"all planning of buildings, public and private, transportation systems, communications sys-
tems, and all public programs and services must make provision for the needs of handicapped
individuals." Id. at 6-7; see also S. REP. No. 1139, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 32, 38 (1974).
30. 29 U.S.C. §§ 720-723. The Supreme Court has frequently directed that related legisla-
tion be construed consistent with each other's purposes. Cf Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 416 (1975); see also supra note 22.
31. See S. REP. No. 318, supra note 29, at 2082-85.
32. 119 CONG. REC. 5882 (1973) (statement of Sen. Cranston).
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may return to their rightful place in their families and commu-
nities as effective participating members as well as become con-
tributors to our economy.
33
Thus, Congress concluded that the elimination of architectural and com-
munication barriers was a crucial antecedent to the provision of effective
rehabilitation services.
Section 504 also made economic sense by freeing handicapped peo-
ple from depending on public assistance and expensive institutional care.
As Senator Humphrey demanded, "Where is the cost-effectiveness in
consigning them to public assistance or 'terminal' care in an institu-
tion?"'34 Senator Percy further asked, "What is the cost effectiveness or
the sense of banishing our handicapped Americans to life on welfare
T),35
Senator Percy observed that the cost of making facilities accessi-
ble-even existing facilities-"would not be great."' 36 But, he reported,
"in strictly economic terms, only 36 percent of this country's handi-
capped people are employed, compared with 71 percent of the nonhandi-
capped population. 37 If barriers were eliminated, he estimated, "13
percent of the chronically handicapped population aged 17 to 65-
189,000 people-could return to work... result[ing] in total yearly eco-
nomic benefits of more than $824 million-a sum large enough to offset
the cost of my bill."
3
Moreover, the lawmakers knew that accessible services could be
provided because they were told so in an unprecedented three years of
hearings on the modern understanding of the capabilities of severely dis-
abled people, the modern techniques of assisting disabled people to real-
ize them, and the historical and contemporary obstacles to achieving
them. Congress' systematic finding underlying section 504 was that se-
verely disabled people, as a matter of fact, can live, learn, and work pro-
ductively in, and as integral members of, the community if architectural
and communications hindrances were removed.39
33. 119 CONG. REC. 24,587 (1973).
34. 118 CONG. REc. 525 (1972).
35. Id. at 11,789. As Senator Javits observed, enabling disabled persons to participate and
to work "produces 'cash dividends' by virtue of the handicapped becoming productive and
because it turns what could be tax consumers into taxpayers. It is a program with a hard nose
as well as a soft heart." 119 CONG. REc. 5887 (1973).
36. 119 CONG. REc. 6496 (1972).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 6497.
39. See Vocational Rehabilitation Services for the Handicapped, Hearings Before the Select
Subcomm. on Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1972); Rehabilitation Act of 1972: Parts I & 2, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Handi-
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Ultimately, though, the legislation was justified in human and moral
terms rather than strict economics. Senator Humphrey asked, "Shall we
condemn 2,100 paralyzed Vietnam veterans simply to exist in isolation?
Should a wheelchair automatically disqualify 250,000 Americans for
jobs?. . . These are harsh questions, but they are questions that must
now be forced upon the conscience of America. There can be no further
delay in affirming the civil rights of 28 million Americans. ' 4° Senator
Williams likewise pointed to the nation's "failure to recognize the intrin-
sic rights of the handicapped. For too long, we have been dealing with
them out of charity, something that we can do when we have enough
time, and enough extra money. This approach has long outlasted its use-
fulness."41 Similarly, Representative Hansen appealed to the members of
the House to vote "not strictly on the basis of dollars and cents and cost
effectiveness, although these items are important.... [L]ook at the in-
tent of this bill in terms of human values and life itself... [G]ive not
only hope to the handicapped but the possibility of a full and complete
life."'4 2 "If the Nation's architectural and transportation barriers were
removed.., some 200,000 people could return to work,"'4 one study
reported. But, "of course, in the end, no cost-benefit analysis can ever
account for the psychological advantages of self-sufficiency, the social
benefits of equal opportunity, or the human costs of continuing to permit
existing barriers to further handicap the handicapped."'
Representative Vanik acknowledged that the states had "plead[ed]
lack of funds,"'45 and that providing meaningful educational opportunity
capped of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1972); Voca-
tional Rehabilitation Services, Parts I & 2, Oversight Hearings Before the Select Subcomm. on
Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Rehabili-
tation Act, 1973: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1973); Rehabilitation Act Amendments of
1974: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). See supra note 29 for House and Senate Reports
discussing Congress' awareness of the fast-developing technology.
40. 118 CONG. REc. 11,790 (1972).
41. Id. at 3321.
42. 119 CONG. REc. 7105 (1973). Senator Randolph agreed that:
We must think of these people of whom I speak, and in a sense for whom I speak,
these handicapped people of the country. It is the desire of their hearts that although
they are handicapped, they want to move forward. They want to do the job. They
may not be wage earners and taxpayers now, but that is what they want to be. That
is what we want them to be. They are citizens of this country. They have the same
right as every Member of this Senate to live in what has been expressed often as
dignity.
119 CONG. REc. 10,802 (1973).
43. Id. at 21,827.
44. Id.
45. 118 CONG. REc. 4341 (1972).
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to handicapped students would be "burdensome to the schools.",46 Nev-
ertheless, he insisted that handicapped persons are entitled to equal edu-
cational opportunity "as U.S. citizens." 47
Thus, from the beginning, Congress was informed that measures to
bar the exclusion of disabled people from federally funded programs
would be costly and that the financial burden would have to be borne by
the institutions receiving federal funds. Nonetheless, Congress decided
that those burdens were outweighed by the economic and moral benefits
of including handicapped people as United States citizens.
B. The 1974 Rehabilitation Act Amendments
In 1974, Congress amended the definition of the term "handicapped
individual" as used in section 504 to insure that section 504 would have a
broad scope.48 These amendments are significant for two reasons: First,
the amendments affirm Congress' commitment that section 504 be all
inclusive and require the elimination of architectural and communication
barriers. Second, Congress clarified its intent that the Secretary of HEW
promulgate a comprehensive section 504 regulation for recipients of fed-
eral assistance.
In hearings conducted by the Senate Subcommittee on the Handi-
capped on the proposed amendments, HEW officials responded to ques-
tions concerning section 504 as follows:
Section 504 ... enumerates a broad government policy ....
On the basis of the legislative history, this Department's Office
of the General Counsel has concluded that this provision is
clearly mandatory and requires enforcement with respect to all
aspects of discrimination .... [T]his Department fully intends
to treat Section 504 as civil rights legislation that is remedial in
design and to construe the legislation broadly to effectuate its
purposes, to correct and alleviate conditions adversely affecting
handicapped individuals in federally-assisted programs.49
46. 117 CONG. REc. 45,975 (1971).
47. Id.
48. Pub. L. No. 93-516, 88 Stat. 1617 (1974). These were "important amendments that
clarified the scope of § 504.... [A]s virtually contemporaneous and more specific elaborations
of the general norm that Congress had enacted into law the previous year, the amendments
and their history do shed significant light on the intent with which § 504 was enacted." Alex-
ander, 469 U.S. at 306 n.27; accord NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, 599 F.2d 1247,
1258 n.48 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1052 (1983) ("The 1974 Amendments were
enacted to clarify the 1973 Act, and should be accorded great weight when interpreting Con-
gressional intent.").
49. Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974: Hearings Before the U.S. Senate Subcomm.
June 1987] 1479
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HEW's view was adopted, almost verbatim, in the Senate Report on the
bill.50
The Senate Report further stated that section 504 covered "many
forms of potential discrimination" and "was enacted to prevent discrimi-
nation against all handicapped individuals, . . . in relation to Federal
assistance in employment, housing, transportation, education, health
services, or any other Federally-aided programs."'" The Report indi-
cates that section 504 was intended to remedy the injury to "[i]ndividuals
with handicaps [who] are all too often excluded from schools and educa-
tional programs,... [and] denied access to transportation, buildings, and
housing because of architectural barriers."52 With the enactment of the
Rehabilitation Act, disabled people were to be provided the "basic
human right of full participation in life and society." 3 Thus, as the
Supreme Court has recognized, the 1974 amendments "reflected Con-
gress' concern with protecting the handicapped against discrimination
stemming not only from simple prejudice, but from 'archaic attitudes and
laws' and from 'the fact that the American people are simply unfamiliar
with and insensitive to the difficulties confront[ing] individuals With
handicaps.' "I'
As Representative Vanik stated, "section 504... guarantees, with-
out qualification, equal rights for the handicapped in federally funded or
assisted programs. Its similarity to Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
in this respect, gives reason to describe section 504 as a Civil Rights Act
for the handicapped.""5 Its purpose, he stressed, was to "make available
to the handicapped the same government-provided programs and privi-
leges that the nonhandicapped enjoy.",16 In like manner, the Senate Re-
port stated that "[s]ection 504 was patterned after, and is almost
on the Handicapped of the Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 224
(1974) [hereinafter 1974 U.S. Senate Subcomm on the Handicapped Hearings].
50. S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 6373, 6390.
51. Id. at 38, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6388.
52. Id. at 50, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6400.
53. Id. at 56, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6406 (emphasis
added). The Supreme Court consistently has relied on the Senate Report on the 1974 amend-
ments as an authoritative exposition of the congressional intent underlying § 504. See Com-
munity Television v. Gottfried, 459 U.S. 498, 509 (1983); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone,
465 U.S. 624, 634 n.15 (1984); Alexander, 469 U.S. at 293 n.7, 304 n.24, 306 & n.27.
54. School Bd. v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123, 1126 (1987) (quoting S. REP. No. 1297, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1974)).
55. 120 CONG. REc. 11,128 (1974) (emphasis added).
56. Id. To the same effect, Congress proclaimed that the final goal of the Rehabilitation
Act was "the complete integration of all individuals with handicaps into normal community
living, working, and service patterns." White House Conference on Handicapped Individuals
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identical to" Title VI.5'
The legislative history of the 1974 amendments also provides impor-
tant support for the approach taken in the HEW section 504 regulations.
In 1973, six weeks after the enactment of section 504, the members of the
Senate Subcommittee on the Handicapped, "as the principal Senate au-
thors of the Act,"58 wrote to the Secretary of HEW 9 urging him to issue
regulations to "enforce compliance with the... command of the sec-
tion."60 At the hearings on the 1974 amendments, HEW officials re-
sponded that they were proposing an executive order pursuant to which
"HEW would coordinate the development of a consistent, government-
wide approach including the formulation of substantive standards and
enforcement strategies," and HEW's Office for Civil Rights was already
in the process of "elaborating on the nature and scope of discrimination
against handicapped persons."" The Senate Report ratified this ap-
proach, noting specifically that "such regulations and enforcement are
intended,"62 and suggesting that since HEW had "experience in dealing
with handicapped persons and with the elimination of discrimination in
other areas," that the Department therefore should assume the lead role
in implementing section 504.13
C. The HEW Construction
It was April 28, 1977. There were celebrations in the homes and
workplaces of disabled people across the nation. The disabled commu-
nity had demonstrated at each of HEW's ten regional offices and had
occupied Secretary Califano's office for twenty-eight hours and the offices
of Region IX in San Francisco for twenty-two days.' The Secretary had
signed a regulation promising meaningful access to all HEW assisted
Act, Pub. L. No. 93-516, § 301(6), 88 Stat. 1631 (1974) (enacted the same day as the 1974
amendments).
57. S. REP. No. 1297, supra note 50, at 39.
58. The letter is reprinted in the 1974 U.S. Senate Subcomm. on the Handicapped Hear-
ings, supra note 49, at 317.
59. Id. at 317-19.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 215-16.
62. S. REP. No. 1297, supra note 50, at 40; accord H.R. REP. No. 1457, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 27 (1974).
63. S. REP. No. 1297, supra note 50, at 40.
64. The events surrounding the promulgation of the regulation are described in the official
Department of Education Handbook for the Implementation of Section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, OCR HAND-
BOOK FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973, at
18 (1981) [hereinafter DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION HANDBOOK]; see also Arline, 107 S. Ct.
at 1126 n.3.
June 1987] 1481
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:1471
programs and activities. That rule would set the standard for every fed-
eral agency.
Since the disability community's Magna Carta65 is the HEW section
504 regulation governing federal grantees, this Article initially discusses
that rule's requirements and its factual bases before proceeding to a dis-
cussion of the HEW coordination regulation affecting other agencies and
HEW's official policy interpretations construing its regulations.
1. The 1977 HEW grantee regulation
On April 28, 1977, HEW promulgated a rule to enforce the rights of
handicapped persons to participate in the activities of HEW grantees.
The regulation established "a mandate to end discrimination and to bring
handicapped persons into the mainstream of American life."' 66 The ac-
cessibility provisions of the HEW regulation67 are not waivable. Simulta-
neously, the HEW regulation creates a long list of ways to provide
accessibility and permits any of those methods for providing access.
In drafting a regulation to prohibit exclusion, the Secretary deter-
mined that "different or special treatment of handicapped persons, be-
cause of their handicaps, may be necessary," for "it is meaningless to
'admit' a handicapped person in a wheelchair to a program if the pro-
gram is offered only on the third floor of a walk-up building. ' 68 The
Secretary acknowledged that "providing equal access to programs may
involve major burdens on some recipients.
69
Yet the Secretary stressed: "Those burdens and costs, to be sure,
provide no basis for exemption from Section 504 or this regulation. Con-
gress' mandate to end discrimination is clear."70 The Secretary's section-
by-section analysis7 also addressed the same issue: "The Secretary be-
lieves that the standard [for existing facilities] is flexible enough to permit
65. In a statement accompanying the regulation, the Secretary characterized § 504 as a
"charter of equality" to "end the shameful national neglect of handicapped individuals,"
quoted in DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION HANDBOOK, supra note 64, at 21.
66. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,676 (1977).
67. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.1-84.61 (1986). Following the breakup of HEW, the Department of
Education issued its own regulation, 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.1-104.61 (1986), identical to the HEW
(now Department of Health and Human Services) rule.
68. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,676 (1977).
69. Id.
70. Id. (emphasis added).
71. The "analysis of the regulation ... describes the basis and purpose of each section
... " 42 Fed. Reg. 22,677 (1977). Such an analysis is entitled to substantial deference since it
is issued by the Secretary who not only promulgated the regulations but also was responsible
for administering the statutes. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566 (1980).
The Supreme Court relied upon the Secretary's section-by-section analysis in Southeastern
Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406-07 & n.7 (1979), Alexander, 469 U.S. at 305
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recipients to devise ways to make their programs accessible short of ex-
tremely expensive or impractical physical changes in facilities. Accord-
ingly, the section does not allow for waivers."72 Describing this principle
as "the central requirement of the regulation," the Secretary emphasized
that "[e]very existing facility need not be made physically accessible, but
all recipients must ensure that programs conducted in those facilities are
made accessible."
'73
Having set forth the general standard, the Secretary allowed ex-
traordinary flexibility for compliance with the standard. The regulation
applied only to "otherwise qualified" handicapped individuals, defined
with respect to the provision of services as those who meet the "essential
eligibility requirements for the receipt of such services."'74 Moreover,
section 84.22(b) of the regulation permitted the use of any method that
makes a program or activity accessible including "such means as rede-
sign of equipment, reassignment of classes or other services to accessible
buildings, assignment of aides to beneficiaries, home visits, delivery of
health, welfare, or other social services at alternate accessible sites, alter-
ation of existing facilities and construction of new facilities."7 The regu-
lation permitted the choice of any of these "means," but a choice had to
be made; the meaningful access requirements could not be waived.
At the same time, section 84.22 expressly provided that structural
modifications to existing facilities were not required in order to achieve
program accessibility. As the Secretary explained, "[s]tructural changes
in existing facilities are required only where there is no other feasible way
n.26, and Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1127 n.5; see also Nelson v. Thorburgh, 567 F. Supp. 369, 380
(E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd, 732 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1188 (1985).
72. 42 Fed. Reg. at 22,689 (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 22,677 (emphasis added). The Department of Education Handbook, supra note
64, which was officially "reviewed and [a]pproved for [u]se by the Department of Education,
Office for Civil Rights" and "constitutes the legal framework for Section 504," repeats this
requirement. Id. at 3, 182-83, 333. The Handbook states, "Section 504 requires that all build-
ings and facilities of recipients of Federal financial assistance be made accessible to handi-
capped persons, insofar as it is necessary to insure that such persons are not denied the benefits
of programs or activities." Id. at 178 (emphasis added).
74. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(4) (1986).
75. Id. § 84.22(b). HEW allowed small health, welfare and other social service providers
an additional method for providing program accessibility in existing facilities. Under
§ 84.22(c), these providers were permitted to refer a handicapped person to another provider
of services who already had an accessible facility. The section-by-section analysis explained
the rationale for this option: "The Secretary believes this last resort referral provision is appro-
priate to avoid imposition of additional costs in the health care area,... and to avoid imposing
significant costs on small, low-budget providers such as day-care centers or foster homes." 42
Fed. Reg. 22,689 (1977). "Thus, for example, a pharmacist might arrange to make home
deliveries of drugs." Id.
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to make the recipient's program accessible."' 76 Even then, the regulation
allowed three years to make such changes. 7
Similar flexibility was built into the requirement that grantees elimi-
nate communication barriers:
Auxiliary aides may include taped texts, interpreters or other
effective methods of making orally delivered materials available
to students with hearing impairments, readers in libraries for
students with visual impairments, classroom equipment
adapted for use by students with manual impairments, and
other similar services and actions. Recipients need not provide
attendants, individually prescribed devices, readers for personal
use or study, or other devices or services of a personal nature.78
In his section-by-section analysis, the Secretary determined that "the
bulk of auxiliary aids" could be obtained without any expenditure by the
grantee and that "[i]n those circumstances where the recipient institution
must provide the educational auxiliary aid, the institution has flexibility
in choosing the methods by which the aids will be supplied.
'79
Moreover, the grantee does not need to have all such aids on hand at
all times. "Thus, readers need not be available in the recipient's library
at all times so long as the schedule of times when a reader is available is
established, is adhered to, and is sufficient. Of course, recipients are not
required to maintain a complete braille library." 0 In addition, these re-
quirements only applied to entities with fifteen or more employees.81
The Secretary built this comprehensive flexibility into the regulation
based on his finding that "factors of burden and cost had to be taken into
account in the regulation in prescribing the actions necessary to end dis-
crimination and to bring handicapped persons into full participation in
federally financed programs and activities." '82 The Secretary found that
this carefully balanced approach "preserves the essential elements of a
strong and effective program for ending discrimination, while avoiding
76. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,689 (1977).
77. 45 C.F.R. § 84.44(d)(2) (1986). All of these flexible approaches are also embodied in
the 1984 Department of Justice regulation. See 28 C.F.R. § 39.150(b), (c) (1986). That regu-
lation, however, additionally allowed the "burdens" waivers in § 39.150(a) and § 39.160(d).
78. 45 C.F.R. § 84.44(d)(2) (1986) (emphasis added).
79. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,693 (1977).
80. Id.
81. 45 C.F.R. § 84.52(d) (1986). The Secretary explained that "although a small nonprofit
neighborhood clinic might not be obligated to have available an interpreter for deaf persons,"
HEW could "require provision of such aids as may be reasonably available to ensure that
qualified handicapped persons are not denied appropriate benefits or services because of their
handicaps." 42 Fed. Reg. 22,694 (1977).
82. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,676 (1978).
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the imposition of unnecessary or counterproductive administrative obli-
gations on recipients."83 The Secretary based this conclusion on a
rulemaking record of mammoth proportions compiled over the course of
almost a year. 4 In terms of architectural barriers, that record included a
study, relied upon by the Secretary and published by him in the Federal
Register, which concluded that "[b]ecause of the flexibility allowed by
the regulation, it is expected that most recipients will be able to achieve
compliance by altering, at the very most, only one-third of their existing
buildings."85 Analyzing the various alternatives available to the Secre-
tary, the study determined:
The approach finally decided upon, which allows recipients to
keep costs minimal by using methods other than physical alter-
ation of all buildings, was believed [by HEW] to constitute the
most equitable balance between the interests of excluded handi-
capped persons and those of recipients. The cost estimates [of
this study], when combined with evidence presented elsewhere
on the magnitude of the benefits that will be generated, lends
support to this decision.86
Similarly, the costs associated with the elimination of communication
83. Id. at 22,677.
84. On May 17, 1976, the Secretary published a Notice of Intent to Issue Proposed Rules
and sought public comment on 15 identified critical issues. 41 Fed. Reg. 20,296 (1976). A
draft proposal of the rule and a statement of the estimated economic and inflationary impact of
the draft proposal was attached to the Notice of Intent. In response to the Notice of Intent,
over 300 written comments were received and a series of 10 meetings conducted by the Office
for Civil Rights were held at various locations across the country.
On July 16, 1976, after analyzing comments received on the critical issues identified in the
Notice of Intent, the Secretary published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and set forth a
revised proposed regulation for public comment. 41 Fed. Reg. 29,548 (1976). In response to
numerous requests, the initial 60-day comment period was extended until October 14, 1976,
and additional comments received after that date were also considered. A total of more than
700 comments were received in response to the July 16 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.
These were analyzed along with approximately 150 comments sent in response to the May 17
Notice that had been received too late to be analyzed during the first period for comment. An
additional 22 public meetings were held after publication of the July 16 Notice to inform
interested persons and organizations of the proposed regulation and to solicit their comments
and recommendations. Transcripts of all these meetings were made, and analyzed along with
the written comments. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,676-77 (1977). For a further discussion of the depth
and thoughtfulness of the rulemaking process, see Implementation of Section 504, Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select Education of the House Comm. on
Education and Labor, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 169, 239, 292-94 (1977) [hereinafter 1977 Section
504 Implementation Hearings].
85. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST HANDICAPPED PERSONS: The Costs, Benefits
and Inflationary Impact of Implementing Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 Cover-
ing Recipients of HEW Financial Assistance, 41 Fed. Reg. 20,312, 20,333 (1976).
86. Id. at 20,337.
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barriers were determined to be "not... substantial" since "[a]ids and
services can often be provided at minimum expense by making them
available" in a central location like a library or resource center.87 The
overall "conclusion of the analysis" was that:
the benefits forthcoming (psychic as well as pecuniary) provide
a substantial offset to the costs that will be incurred. The costs
involved will not be as great as is widely thought and the com-
pelling situation of some of the handicapped persons involved
tips the balance in favor of proceeding with immediate imple-
mentation of the regulation.
8
"[I]n all cases," the study determined, "there was evidence for pecuniary
benefits that provide substantial offsets to the pecuniary cost involved.
Indeed, even if non-pecuniary benefits are not added, the balance of bene-
fits and costs appears [to be] in favor of implementation of the
regulation."
' s9
2. The 1978 HEW coordination regulation
On April 28, 1976, President Ford issued Executive Order No.
11,914,90 directing the Secretary of HEW to coordinate the implementa-
tion of section 504 by all federal departments and agencies extending fi-
nancial assistance. The Executive Order required the Secretary to
establish "standards for determining who are handicapped individuals
and guidelines for determining what are discriminatory practices, within
the meaning of Section 504."91
Closely on the heels of the initial HEW grantee regulation, HEW
issued a proposed rule on June 24, 1977, to carry out its responsibility
under the Executive Order. HEW promulgated a final rule enforcing the
87. Id. at 20,361. In terms of the benefits of the regulation, the study concluded that:
[In purely economic terms,] [i]ncreased building accessibility will generate benefits in
three areas: (1) reduced costs of providing elementary and secondary education to
some handicapped children; (2) increased lifetime earning capacity of those addi-
tional handicapped youngsters who will now go on to college and (3) the increased
earnings capacity of handicapped workers who can now find better employment of
their skills in jobs located in newly accessible buildings.
Id. at 20,337.
88. Id. at 20,320.
89. Id. at 20,364. As the HEW study projected, disabled people have dramatically begun
to move into the mainstream in HEW-assisted programs. For example, it was reported at a
recent congressional hearing that, as a result of the HEW regulation, the number of disabled
students entering college has more than doubled. See H.R. RaP. No. 829, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
12 (1984). At Ohio State University, for example, the number of disabled freshmen went from
32 in 1975 to 662 in 1984. Id.
90. 41 Fed. Reg. 17,871 (1976).
91. Exec. Order No. 11,914, § 1, 41 Fed. Reg. 17,871 (1976).
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Executive Order on January 13, 1978.92
This regulation, consistent with the earlier HEW grantee regulation,
permitted no waivers. In the same flexible manner as the previous regu-
lation, it required that other agencies' regulations prohibit exclusion
based on architectural and communication barriers.93 As the official
HEW analysis explained, the rule "does not prohibit architectural barri-
ers; it does prohibit exclusion of handicapped people from federally as-
sisted programs and activities by virtue of such barriers."94
The heads of numerous other federal agencies95 have promulgated
the same requirements and compiled their own administrative records
that factually supported this approach.
96
92. The regulation is currently codified at 28 C.F.R. §§ 41.1-41.7 (1986). On November 2,
1980, President Carter issued Executive Order No. 12,250 which transferred the coordination
authority for § 504 to the Department of Justice. On August 11, 1981, the regulation was
transferred to its present location at 28 C.F.R. §§ 41.1-41.7 (1986). See 46 Fed. Reg. 40,686
(1981).
93. 28 C.F.R. § 41.57 (1986).
94. 43 Fed. Reg. 2135 (1978).
95. See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. §§ 900.701-.710 (1986) (effective Nov. 14, 1980) (Office of Public
Management); 7 C.F.R. §§ 15b.1-.42 (1986) (effective June 11, 1982) (Department of Agricul-
ture); 10 C.F.R. §§ 4.101-.233 (1986) (effective Mar. 6, 1980) (Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion); 10 C.F.R. §§ 1040.61-.74 (1986) (effective June 13, 1980) (Department of Energy); 13
C.F.R. §§ 113.1-.8 (1986) (effective Apr. 4, 1979) (Small Business Administration); 14 C.F.R.
§§ 382.1-.25 (1986) (effective June 6, 1982) (Civil Aeronautics Board); 14 C.F.R. §§ 1251.100 -
.400 (1986) (effective Sept. 10, 1979) (National Aeronautics and Space Administration); 15
C.F.R. §§ 8b.1-.25 (1986) (effective Apr. 23, 1982) (Department of Commerce); 18 C.F.R.
§§ 1307.1-.13 (1986) (effective Apr. 4, 1980) (Tennessee Valley Authority); 22 C.F.R.
§§ 142.1-.63 (1986) (effective Oct. 21, 1980) (Department of State); 22 C.F.R. §§ 217.1-.61
(1986) (effective Oct. 6, 1980) (Agency for International Development); 29 C.F.R. §§ 32.1-.51
(1986) (effective Oct. 7, 1980) (Department of Labor); 31 C.F.R. § 51.55 (1986) (effective Sept.
30, 1981) (Department of the Treasury); 32 C.F.R. §§ 56.1-.7 (1986) (effective Apr. 8, 1982)
(Department of Defense); 34 C.F.R. § 104.1 (1986) (effective May 9, 1980) (Department of
Education); 38 C.F.R. §§ 18.401-.461 (1986) (effective Sept. 24, 1980) (Veterans Administra-
tion); 43 C.F.R. §§ 17.200-.280 (1986) (effective July 7, 1982) (Department of Interior); 45
C.F.R. §§ 1151.1-.44 (1986) (effective Apr. 17, 1979) (National Endowment for the Arts); 45
C.F.R §§ 1170.1-.55 (1986) (effective Nov. 12, 1981) (National Endowment for the Humani-
ties); 45 C.F.R. §§ 1232.1-.16 (1986) (effective May 30, 1979) (ACTION).
96. To take just one of the rulemaking records associated with the regulations compiled in
note 95, supra, by way of illustration, the Department of Labor's regulatory analysis deter-
mined that "about 105,000 additional handicapped individuals would benefit from more acces-
sible employment and training facilities." 45 Fed. Reg. 66,721 (1980). The Department of
Labor concluded that the rule would have a substantial beneficent effect on "persons with
severe physical handicaps who are not currently using employment and training services be-
cause of architectural or communications barriers but who would avail themselves of these
services if they were offered in more accessible facilities." Id. Moreover, "other benefits"
would "accrue to society as a result of increased participation by the handicapped" in the form
of a reduced need for veterans benefits, rehabilitation, disability, medical and food stamp pay-
ments. Id. at 66,718. The Department also acknowledged "intangible benefits such as greater
independence for handicapped individuals, a more productive workforce and a larger pool of
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3. The 1978 HEW policy interpretations
A department's interpretation of its prior regulation is entitled to
particular deference.9 7 After enforcing its regulation for over a year,
HEW's Office for Civil Rights issued two policy interpretations on Au-
gust 14, 1978.
In Policy Interpretation No. 3, HEW stated that "[b]ecause of the
administrative impossibility of continually determining... whether mo-
bility impaired individuals will be entitled to services by a given recipi-
ent," the absence of mobility impaired persons residing in an area
"cannot be used as the test of whether programs and activities must be
made accessible." 98 After carefully reviewing the problems of smaller
grantees and its own enforcement effort to date, and noting the referral
option in section 84.22(c) for small employees and the extremely wide
range of permissible options available for providing accessible services,
the Policy Interpretation provided: "The Department concludes, as it
did when the section 504 regulation was adopted, that because the 'stan-
dard (for program accessibility) is flexible' the regulation 'does not allow
for waivers.' 99
Policy Interpretation No. 4 recognized, moreover, that the regula-
tion did not require the impossible, and that isolated hardships and con-
flicting laws and policies may arise even when the rule was uniformly
applied in the vast majority of cases. Thus, the agency permitted grant-
ees to provide physically handicapped persons access to certain of their
programs, by means of carrying them, under two circumstances. First,
carrying was deemed an appropriate alternative as an interim measure in
those instances "when program accessibility can be achieved only
through structural changes."'"
skilled taxpaying workers." Id. "[W]hen individuals move from being recipients of various
types of welfare payments to skilled taxpaying workers, there are obviously many benefits not
only for the individuals but for the whole society." Id. at 66,721. "The capital costs would
largely be one time expenditures while the number of beneficiaries would increase over time."
Id. at 66,718. Moreover, the regulatory analysis stated that the Labor Department, like HEW,
permitted small grantees to comply by referral in order to avoid any "undue burden on their
limited resources." Id. at 66,719. The rule would "provide a wider range of employment and
training services to the physically handicapped who have difficulties with architectural barri-
ers," but "excessive financial burdens are not placed on local jurisdictions." Id. at 66,721.
97. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565-66 (1980); United States v.
Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872 (1977); Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Porter County Chapter of
the Izaak Walton League, 423 U.S. 12, 14-15 (1975); Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268,
276 (1969); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,
325 U.S. 410, 413-14 (1945).
98. 43 Fed. Reg. 36,034 (1978).
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 36,035.
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Second, carrying was also accepted in "manifestly exceptional
cases," situations in which "structural changes" that were "prohibitively
expensive or unavailable" would be required.1"1 Thus, like its regulation,
HEW's policy interpretations thoughtfully struck a sensitive balance be-
tween the right of handicapped persons to access and the burdens en-
tailed in providing that right1"2 while prohibiting exemptions or waivers
of the statutory duty to provide meaningful program accessibility.
D. The 1978 Rehabilitation Act Amendments
In January, 1977, the members of the Ninety-Fifth Congress assem-
bled in Washington. Before a gavel had dropped and before a speech had
been delivered, a package appeared on each member's desk with a letter
from outgoing HEW Secretary Mathews. The letter stated that the sec-
tion 504 regulations were completed but he had left office without signing
them because he believed it was "in the public interest to lay them before
the Congress." ' 3 Noting that it was "obvious that the requirements
under this statute could occasion expenditures by a number of institu-
tions," Secretary Mathews expressed his desire that "the Executive and
Legislative branches.., work together so that it cannot be said that the
Executive Branch had pursued policy beyond or in contradiction to what
Congress authorized."'" He asked "the Congress [to] provide whatever
clarification is appropriate."'
' 0 5
101. Id. The Office for Civil Rights stated that an example of such a "manifestly excep-
tional case" was a class in oceanography that of necessity took place in a diving bell. Id.
102. The Agency has taken the same common sense approach in numerous reported en-
forcement actions. See, eg., Letter from A. Hamlin, Assistant General Counsel to Paul J.
Forch (May 5, 1978) (sign language interpreters must be made available by schools for tutor-
ing deaf students only if the institution provides tutors as a free service to all students), re-
printed in DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION HANDBOOK, supra note 64, at 190-91; OCR
Memorandum from Melvyn Leventhal to Cindy Brown (Sept. 29, 1978) (doors or freight ele-
vators are acceptable means of ingress and egress to existing facilities), reprinted in DEPART-
MENT OF EDUCATION HANDBOOK, supra note 64, at 194; OCR Memorandum from Ned
Stutman to Ed Redman (Dec. 6, 1979) (lowering water fountains and elevator control buttons
for wheelchair users not required in existing facility so long as handicapped persons not denied
program access), reprinted in DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION HANDBOOK, supra note 64, at
190; Letter from David S. Tatel to Robert J. Bolger (June 20, 1977) (inaccessible drug store in
existing facility may comply by providing deliveries of drugs outside the store), reprinted in
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION HANDBOOK, supra note 64, at 211; OCR Memorandum from
Burton Taylor to Cindy Brown (Sept. 22, 1978) (public telephone equipped for hearing dis-
abled, special room markers for use of visually disabled, or lowering of mirrors, dispensers,
and fire alarms for wheelchair users not required in existing facility), reprinted in DEPART-
MENT OF EDUCATION HANDBOOK, supra note 64, at 190-91.
103. 1977 Section 504 Implementation Hearings, supra note 84, at 73-75.
104. Id.
105. Secretary Mathews' action was discussed during the oversight hearings on § 504 con-
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In response, Congress indicated that the regulation properly and
faithfully conformed to the statutory requirements, and extended those
requirements to the Executive. In the twenty-two month period that
closely corresponded to the life of the Ninety-Fifth Congress,10 6 the regu-
lation was extensively discussed and analyzed on the House and Senate
floor. No one spoke in opposition to the prohibition of waivers in the
accessibility mandates of those rules. This busy period for section 504
culminated in 1978 with the passage of comprehensive amendments to
the Rehabilitation Act. In enacting these amendments, Congress re-
viewed, affirmed and adopted HEW's course of construction in ten ways:
First, Congress added a provision to section 504 to extend its cover-
age, and that of the HEW regulation, to federally conducted and grantee
programs. This was done to establish a uniform national effort to pro-
vide access and to remedy the unfairness of subjecting federal grantees to
burdens from which the Executive itself was immune.
10 7
Second, Congress made available under section 504 the "remedies,
procedures and rights set forth in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964"' 101 in order to codify the substance of the HEW rule1" 9 and the
ducted in September, 1977, by the House Subcommittee on Select Education. His letter, dated
January 18, 1977, was made a part of the record of those hearings. Id.
106. The Ninety-Fourth Congress also had participated actively in and was constantly kept
abreast of the HEW regulation. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 721, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1975).
Martin H. Gerry, the Director of HEW's Office for Civil Rights, presented extensive testimony
at oversight hearings conducted by the Senate Subcommittee on the Handicapped concerning
§ 504 and the approach HEW was taking in drafting its regulation. HEW was in the process
of "confront[ing] and attempt[ing] to resolve various major policy issues," he stated, so that
the regulation "will provide recipients accurate and adequate notice of their specific obligations
and will minimize the need to make ad hoc decisions on these questions in the future." Reha-
bilitation of the Handicapped Programs, 1976: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Handi-
capped of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 1491
(1976) [hereinafter 1976 Rehabilitation of the Handicapped Programs]. In addition to dozens
of national organizations representing grantees and disabled people, HEW consulted numerous
experts on all aspects of the regulation, such as the requirements concerning architectural
barriers, in order to "solicit information and opinion to enable us to ensure that specific sec-
tions of the regulation adequately deal with areas in which discrimination against handicapped
persons has been identified." Id. at 1496-98, 1503-05.
107. See infra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
108. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) (1982) (emphasis added). This provision was designed to "en-
hance the ability of handicapped individuals to assure compliance with the civil rights provi-
sions of title V." S. REP. No. 890, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1978).
109. The Senate Report stated that this provision "codifies existing practice as a specific
statutory requirement." Id. at 19 (emphasis added). In Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, the
Supreme Court ruled that "the legislative history reveals that this section was intended to
codify the regulations of [HEW] regarding enforcement of § 504." 465 U.S. 624, 635 (1984).
Accord Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 304 n.24 (1985) (noting the Consolidated holding
that the "1978 Amendments to the Act were intended to codify the regulations enforcing
§ 504").
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intent previously expressed in the 1974 Senate Report that HEW was to
promulgate regulations to enforce the broad mandate of section 504.
Third, Congress established an Interagency Coordinating Council to
"maximize effort[s]" and insure uniform "implementation and enforce-
ment" of section 504, including "the regulations prescribed
thereunder. "110
Next, Congress clarified the HEW regulation to confirm its coverage
of persons addicted to alcohol or drugs, but excluded for the purposes of
employment those whose "current use of alcohol or drugs prevents such
individual from performing the duties of the job in question or... would
constitute a direct threat to property or the safety of others." This clari-
fication was enacted to alleviate the concern of several members of Con-
gress about the scope of the HEW regulation regarding that issue."'
Fifth, Congress authorized the Architectural and Transportation
Barriers Compliance Board (ATBCB) to "provide appropriate technical
assistance to any ... entity affected by regulations" promulgated pursu-
ant to section 504 "with respect overcoming to [sic] architectural, trans-
portation, and communication barriers." '112
Sixth, in order to aid federal grantees in their compliance with the
HEW section 504 regulations, Congress authorized "financial assistance
110. 29 U.S.C. § 794c (Supp. III 1985) (emphasis added). Section 794a(a)(2), of course,
does not exhaust the basis for the holdings in Consolidated and Alexander. Section 794c, and
each of the other ten statutory provisions, also provide equally sound bases for those holdings.
111. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982). See 124 CONG. REc. 14,507, 22,711-12 (1978) (state-
ment of Rep. Hyde); id. at 30,322-23 (statement of Sen. Cannon); id. at 30,323-24, 37,509-10
(statement of Sen. Williams); Oversight Hearings on the Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Select Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 494-500 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 Section 504 Oversight Hearings]; see also
School Board v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1130 n.14; Le Strange v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 687
F.2d 767, 775 (3d Cir. 1982), aff'd, 465 U.S. 624 (1984).
112. 29 U.S.C. § 792(d)(3) (1982) (emphasis added). Representative Jeffords, the sponsor
of this provision, stated on the floor of the House that the purpose of the section was to "help
[grantees] ... eliminate architectural, transportation, and communication barriers where ever
they exist," and noted the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board's
(ATBCB) expertise in providing assistance regarding that aspect of 504. 124 CONG. RFC.
13,603 (1978). The legislative history for this section further reveals that ATBCB's focus was
to be on structural modifications required by the HEW regulation "in achieving the desired
goals of Section 504" and delineated what it considered "[n]on-structural methods of removing
or eliminating barriers" by verbatim reference to the HEW program accessibility regulation:
"reassignment of classes or other services to accessible buildings; assignment of aides; home
visits; delivery of health, welfare, and other such services at alternate accessible sites; and other
such methods short of physical alteration that are permitted in order to achieveprogram acces-
sibility under Section 504 regulations." S. REP. No. 890, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1978) (em-
phasis added). Compare 45 C.F.R. § 84.22 (1986). This definitive statement in the Senate
Report leaves little room for disagreement concerning Congress' awareness and approval of
the program accessibility requirement, including its intense flexibility.
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... for the purpose of removing architectural, transportation, and com-
munication barriers," but only upon a demonstration of the "need" for
such assistance.1 13 In addition, Congress also directed the ATBCB to
conduct an "assessment of the amounts required to be expended.., to
provide handcapped [sic] individuals withfull access to all programs and
activities receiving Federal assistance."" 4
Next, Congress authorized grants for local rehabilitation centers "to
provide a focal point in communities" for the distribution of "informa-
tion and technical assistance," encompassing specific aids to eliminate
communication barriers "such as interpreters for the deaf," in order to
"assist" the "local governmental units" and "nonprofit entities" to
"compl[y] with this [Act], particularly the requirements of section
[504]. "115
113. 29 U.S.C. § 794b(3) (1982) (emphasis added).
114. 29 U.S.C. § 792(h)(1) (1982) (emphasis added). These provisions originated in a pro-
posed amendment to the Labor-HEW Appropriations bill, H.R. 7555, proposed by Represen-
tative Jeffords, two weeks after the HEW regulation was issued, which would have authorized
$2.4 billion for barrier removal. See 123 CONG. REc. 19,051 (1977). As a result of the 1977
Section 504 Implementation Hearings, supra note 84, however, Representative Jeffords became
convinced that "there is still great uncertainty about specifically how much full implementa-
tion will cost." 123 CONG. Rnc. 37,772 (1977). The studies referenced in § 792(h)(1) were
later conducted. See 44 Fed. Reg. 54,954 n.3 (1979); 45 Fed. Reg. 37,629 n.7 (1980). As a
result of this report, Congress in 1979 provided an initial $25 million in grants "to assist insti-
tutions... in the removal of architectural barriers for the handicapped" as a result of "the
demands placed on institutions resulting from Section 504 regulations." H.R. REP. No. 244,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1979) (emphasis added). More substantial sums were made available
in Title VII of the Education Amendments of 1980 to assist grantees "with the requirements of
[section 504]." 20 U.S.C. § l132a(2)(B) (1983). The intent was to help institutions to comply
with § 504. H.R. REp. No. 520, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1979).
115. 29 U.S.C. § 775(a)(1), (2) (emphasis added). In keeping with the understanding that
compliance with § 504 required providing aids to eliminate communication barriers, as re-
quired by the HEW rule, Congress took a number of steps to improve the availability of such
services and to ease the financial burden of compliance. For example, Congress authorized
grants to assist public or private nonprofit organizations in establishing or operating 12 pro-
grams "[flor the purpose of training a sufficient number of interpreters to meet the communi-
cations needs of deaf individuals." 29 U.S.C. § 774(d)(1) (1982). Section 774(d) was enacted,
in part, "in response to the requirements imposed by section 504." S. REP. No. 890, supra note
112, at 41 (emphasis added). In addition, Congress authorized the Commissioner of the Reha-
bilitation Services Administration to make grants for the purpose of "expand[ing] the quality
and scope of reading services available to blind persons" and "establish[ing] within each State
a program of interpreter services (including interpreter referral services) which shall be made
available to deaf individuals and to any public agency or private nonprofit organization in-
volved in the delivery of assistance or services to deaf individuals." 29 U.S.C. §§ 777d(a)(2),
777e(a) (1982).
The legislative history of the 1978 amendments contains voluminous materials demon-
strating Congress' awareness of and special concern for communication barriers. See H.R.
REp. No. 1149, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, 16-17, (1978); S. REP. No. 890, supra note 112, at 4,
21, 41-42, 45, 70-71; H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1780, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 76, 78-79, 81-82 (1978);
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Eighth, Congress amended section 501 of the Act1 16 to provide that
"[i]n fashioning an equitable or affirmative action remedy under such
section, a court may take into account the reasonableness of the cost of
any necessary work place accommodation," '17 as the HEW Section 504
employment regulation had already permitted. Congress, however, re-
fused to permit that approach to be grafted into section 504's other acces-
sibility guarantees.
1978 Section 504 Oversight Hearings, supra note 111, at 588-89, 594-95, 598-99 (1978); Reha-
bilitation Amendments of 1978: Hearings on S. 2600 Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped
of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 222-23, 506-54 (1978); 1977
Section 504 Implementation Hearings, supra note 84, at 84, 57, 59, 206, 244, 247, 278-79, 370-
71, 466-67. The legislative history also reflects the general understanding that the HEW regu-
lation prohibited grantees from denying access to their programs due to the existence of com-
munication barriers. S. REP. No. 890, supra note 112. Representative Harkin stated that the
HEW rule required that "all institutions provide... equal access to facilities and equal availa-
bility of programs to all individuals." 123 CONG. REc. 26,255 (1977) (statement of Rep. Har-
kin). Representative Harkin noted with approval the decision in Barnes v. Converse College,
436 F. Supp. 635 (D.S.C. 1977), in which the district court ruled that the HEW regulation
required the provision of interpreter services for a deaf college student, despite the court's
dislike for the regulation: "No educational administrator needs to be reminded of the.., fact
that federal money means pervasive, bureaucratic federal control; and for pervasive, tyrannical
bureaucratic federal control, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare knows no
equal or superior." Barnes, 436 F. Supp. at 638.
116. 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1982).
117. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1) (1982). Senator McClure's amendment, as originally offered,
was a significantly broader proviso "that no equitable relief or affirmative action remedy dis-
proportionately exceeding actual damages in the case shall be available under this section."
124 CONG. REC. 30,576 (1978). The proposed amendment was vigorously opposed by both
the majority and minority Senate managers of the bill. In particular, Senator Stafford stated
his concern:
[T]his amendment.., would put a ceiling, in my judgment, on the remedy
which a person may be entitled to under section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act.
I am concerned about any action which seeks to place a limit upon an individual's civil
rights and rights of access.
After hundreds of years of being alienated, degraded, insulted, and otherwise
ignored by society, the Congress of the United States has given the handicapped
population access to their civil rights in section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
This amendment, I fear, would take away part of their rights as individuals.
Id. at 30,578 (emphasis added); see also id. at 30,577-78 (statement of Sen. Cranston). As a
result of this opposition, compromise language was agreed upon confining the exclusion to
"work place accommodation." 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1). This eliminated any ambiguity about
the unqualified right to access under § 504. The debate over the McClure amendment and the
action taken on that amendment to modify it illustrates the congressional intent to insure
handicapped persons' access to federally assisted activities.
The HEW regulation, consistent with this approach, already had included, for reasons
discussed infra at notes 253-65 and accompanying text, an exception to the meaningful access
requirement of its employment regulation only, allowing employers to assert an "undue hard-
ship" defense. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (1986). The HEW coordination regulation also provided
for this exception, as did the 1984 Department of Justice regulation. See 28 C.F.R. § 41.53
(1986); 28 C.F.R. § 39.140 (1986) (incorporating by reference 29 C.F.R. § 1616.201-1613.806
(1986)).
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Ninth, in order to encourage private suits and enforce the HEW reg-
ulation, Congress authorized attorney's fees awards for handicapped
plaintiffs who prevail in section 504 claims."1
Finally, Congress proclaimed a new congressional declaration of
purpose for the Act, "the guarantee of equal opportunity,"'1 19 in order to
leave no room for gainsayers.
Thus, by these ten discrete statutory actions, Congress demon-
strated not only its awareness but also its approval of the HEW regula-
tion. During the Ninety-Fifth Congress and prior to the Secretary's final
action on the regulation, disabled Americans had demonstrated at the
ten HEW regional offices and in Washington in April 1977, in an attempt
to obtain a strong rule. Concurrently, Congress already had been paying
118. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b) (1982). This provision traces its origins to a bill introduced by
Representative Koch on August 5, 1977, inspired by the promulgation of the HEW regula-
tions. Representative Koch noted the significance of the HEW rule: "Until recently, many of
the rights, guarantees [sic] by title V, often termed the 'Civil Rights Act for the Disabled,' were
meaningless because there were no regulations to implement section 504 of that title." How-
ever that changed "[this spring," he stated, when "Secretary Califano developed and signed
these regulations, and a broad antidiscrimination program could finally be set into motion."
123 CONG. Rc. 27,821 (1977).
Disabled people had "worked long and hard to obtain these regulations," Representative
Koch observed. Id. but court actions would also be necessary, he believed, "to guarantee
compliance" with those requirements. Id. A law regarding attorney's fees, he stated, would
make "the courts a viable avenue of recourse for disabled Americans whose civil rights are
violated"-those who want "access to a program," or who "face attitudinal and architectural
barriers." Id.
119. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1982). By this language, the Congress has explicitly stated, in the
statutory language itself, its intent to act pursuant to § 5 of the fourteenth amendment, thereby
according § 504 all of the dignity bequeathed by the foremost guarantee of our Constitution.
See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Kat-
zenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). Numerous statements were made during the course
of debate on the 1978 amendments concerning the problem of barriers and the great benefits to
be gained by handicapped people by guaranteeing their access. E.g., 124 CONG. REc. 13,903
(statement of Rep. Gilman); id. at 30,311-12 (statement of Sen. Stafford).
In the 1986 Rehabilitation Act Amendments, Congress once again amended the Act's
statement of purpose to leave no doubt that for all "'individuals with handicaps'" the intent
of the Congress was" 'to maximize their employability, independence, and integration into the
workplace and the community.'" 132 CONG. REc. S12,089 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1986) (quoting
§ 101 of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986). Senator Lowell Weicker, Chairman of
the Senate Subcommittee on the Handicapped, and the sponsor of this measure, explained:
"[Y]ou cannot pin a price tag on human dignity. The dignity of working, of being independ-
ent, or becoming part of our towns and communities-that is what the Rehabilitation Act is all
about for the people of our country who happen to be handicapped." 132 CoNG. Ran. S12,096
(daily ed. Sept. 8, 1986) (statement of Sen. Weicker). The purpose of the amendments was "to
reaffirm our commitment to the millions of disabled individuals in this country... in their
efforts to obtain and maintain employment, achieve independence, and become fully integrated
into community life." Id. at S12,097.
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close attention to the regulation."'0 The issue, as early as then, was waiv-
ers. Representative Koch inserted into the record a statement by Dr.
Frank Bowe, Director of the American Coalition of Citizens with Disa-
bilities, expressing strong concern over reports that the Secretary was
pondering the "inclusion of waivers and loopholes" in the regulation. 1 '
Senator Cranston, responding to what he termed "reports-or rumors,"
wrote a letter to the Secretary and inserted it into the Record. "We in
Congress remain firmly committed to ending completely the present seg-
regation of... handicapped individuals in our society," the letter stated.
"Section 504-which, as you know, I coauthored with Senators Ran-
dolph, Stafford, Williams, and Javits-embodies that commitment."
Senator Cranston made known to the new Secretary his strong approval
of the Mathews draft of the regulation that had been sent to Congress the
preceding January for review:
Tough, effective regulations implementing section 504
should be issued now, and they should be fully and forcefully
implemented so as to achieve the objectives of section 504 at
the earliest possible moment. For far too long, handicapped
individuals have been closed off from the mainstream of life's
opportunities. Section 504, and the regulations you must ap-
prove for its implementation, are their way into our society.
Every potential barrier should be cleared from the path of dis-
abled Americans who are desperately and courageously fighting
for the basic human rights and freedoms to which, as Ameri-
cans, they are fully entitled.
Therefore, I categorically reject any notion that a "sepa-
rate but equal" approach is an acceptable way of dealing with
the civil rights of disabled persons....
Access is the key to full participation in our society. Fail-
ure to achieve full access for all citizens to activities receiving
Federal financial assistance is unacceptable to handicapped
Americans, unacceptable to me, and I trust, unacceptable to
you as well....
Finally, I view as unacceptable any attempt to load the
regulations with avenues for waivers and exceptions that can
serve only to generate paperwork and litigation at the expense
120. E.g., 123 CONG. Rnc. 10,292 (1977) (statement of Rep. Koch). Representative Koch
observed that "the handicapped community has found it necessary to express their dissatisfac-
tion directly to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Tomorrow ... the handi-
capped strike.... I wish the[m] ... success." IaM
121. 123 CONG. Rc. 10,455 (1977).
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of investigation, compliance, and enforcement activities.1 22
On April 28, 1977, when Secretary Califano finally issued the long-
awaited regulation mandating access and prohibiting waivers, he, as had
his predecessor, transmitted a copy to each member of Congress with a
cover letter stating:
A number of you have urged me to sign a strong regulation.
This regulation is strong. In many cases it calls for dramatic
changes in the actions and attitudes of institutions and individ-
uals who are recipients of HEW funds. In implementing the
unequivocal Congressional statute, this regulation opens a new
era of civil rights in America.... I think it especially impor-
tant that Congress evaluate the regulation, and the implementa-
tion process, to ensure that they conform to the will of
Congress. 
123
Congress responded with approval and acknowledgment that the regula-
tion would entail burdens.
1 24
Representative Nolan placed in the Record a statement by the Sec-
retary which stressed that "[n]o exceptions to the program accessibility
requirement will be allowed." 125 In terms of the elimination of commu-
nication'barriers, Congress reiterated the Secretary's requirement that
"programs must provide auxiliary aids, such as readers in school libraries
or interpreters for the deaf, to ensure full participation of handicapped
persons."
126
In September, 1977, the Subcommittee on Select Education of the
House Committee on Education and Labor held oversight hearings con-
122. Id. at 12,410 (1977) (emphasis added). Furthermore, Representative Dodd criticized a
report that the Secretary was "considering major changes which would permit him, in certain
cases, to waive the requirement that recipients of Federal assistance make the facilities in which
they provide their services accessible to the handicapped." Id. at 10,823 (emphasis added).
123. 1977 Section 504 Implementation Hearings, supra note 84, at 76 (emphasis added).
124. E.g., Rehabilitation Extension Amendments of 1977: Hearings on S. 1712 and S. 1596
Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 726-27 (1977) (statement of Sen. Dole); 123 CONG. REC. 13,022-23 (statement
of Rep. Nolan) ("all HEW-funded programs ... will have to be made accessible"); id. at
14,388 (statement of Rep. Oakar) ("need to pay the price to assure to the handicapped the
rights of full citizenship"). Representative Brademas placed in the Record a column by
George F. Will, who, despite his general antipathy for federal regulation supported this one:
"[T]he significance of the regulations is that now the nation must stop rationing citizenship,
must stop allocating to the handicapped only as much as is convenient." Id. at 13,927. By
mandating changes to "thoughtlessly designed facilities that provide no convenient access for
wheelchairs, facilities that shout society's indifference..., [t]he new regulations announce the
beginning of a costly but welcome era." Id.
125. 123 CONG. REc. 18,759 (1977).
126. Id. at 18,760 (emphasis added); see also id. at 19,332.
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cerning the implementation of the section 504 regulation.127 Representa-
tive Brademas, Chairperson of the Subcommittee, opened the hearings by
stating:
With the publication of the regulations for Section 504, dis-
abled people can look forward to their rightful opportunity for
full participation in our society.
Central to the implementation of these regulations must be
the realization that what handicapped people want is access to
programs. Inevitably, enforcement of and compliance with
Section 504 will cause some readjustment problems. Costs may
be incurred and modifications might be required.
1 28
There was no dispute among any of the witnesses, including those
subject to the regulation and the disabled community, about the regula-
tion's mandate. The obligation to eliminate architectural and communi-
cation barriers was assumed by committee members and witnesses alike.
The debate centered instead upon the questions of how much it would
cost and whether the federal government should or should not provide
assistance to ease the burden.'29 As the Minority Committee Counsel
stated: "Nobody on the committee questions whether, there should be
compliance. That is not the issue."
130
Bills were introduced in both the Senate and the House regarding
the costs of implementing the regulation. Floor debate on those bills fo-
cused on the need for better information about the costs; again, no mem-
ber questioned whether HEW had correctly interpreted the scope of the
127. The hearings may have been prompted in part by numerous letters sent to HEW and
Congress and numerous newspaper articles expressing concern over the costs of complying
with the HEW regulation. See DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION HANDBOOK, supra note 64, at
181. The Director of HEW's Office for Civil Rights, David Tatel, issued a statement address-
ing the concerns:
[S]ome people seem to skim over the regulations and explanatory materials and start
fretting about the widening of thousands of doors or installation of high and low
water fountains in every facility at every conceivable point. A result of the misunder-
standing is a rising exaggeration of the potential costs of making programs accessible
.... There will be some costs and some burden on the institutions, fully anticipated
by Congress in the enactment of the law, and the legitimate costs will pose a serious
enough problem without the additional headaches caused to administrators by un-
founded fears. A recent report by Mainstream, Inc., a private nonprofit organization
that encourages compliance with the Rehabilitation Act, indicates that the cost of
making 34 facilities accessible in a survey they conducted totaled one cent per square
foot. These same facilities spend 13 cents a square foot to clean and polish their
floors.
D.S. Tatel, Complying with Section 504-The Costs Have Been Exaggerated, reprinted in DE-
PARTMENT OF EDUCATION HANDBOOK, supra note 64, at 181-82.
128. 1977 Section 504 Implementation Hearings, supra note 84, at 1; see also id. at 169, 289.
129. Id. at 2-3, 11-15, 31-42, 43-45, 171, 182-83, 199-216, 246-50, 253-57, 272-75, 358-60.
130. Id. at 361.
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law. 131 Senator Eagleton stated that with the publication of the section
504 regulation, "it became HEW policy that all recipients of HEW funds
must provide equal access for the handicapped to their services and em-
ployment-or lose their Federal funds. On this basic principle, there
must be no turning back." '132 No one disagreed. The resolution of the
issue was the provision in the 1978 Rehabilitation Act Amendments pro-
viding for federal assistance conditioned on demonstration of need, as
noted above.133 In both the House1 14 and Senate13 5 Reports on the 1978
amendments, the 1978 amendments themselves, and in final floor de-
bate, 1 36 the HEW regulations were discussed again, but no one argued
about the validity of their content except for the concerns for coverage of
persons addicted to alcohol or drugs.
Of particular importance was Representative James Jeffords' under-
standing of the law since he sponsored the provision adding the Execu-
tive to section 504 coverage. Like every other member of Congress,
Representative Jeffords had received copies of the regulation in January,
1977, when Secretary Mathews sent him the proposed rule, and again in
April, 1977, when Secretary Califano sent him the final rule. 37 How-
ever, because he led the effort to obtain funds to assist with section 504
compliance, Representative Jeffords appears to have been more cogni-
zant than other members to the regulation's prohibition of waivers.
131
Six weeks after the waiverless HEW regulation was issued, Repre-
sentative Jeffords introduced a bill to assist with the costs of compliance.
Citing the architectural accessibility requirements and quoting at length
from the regulatory provision requiring auxiliary aids to eliminate com-
munication barriers, he verbalized his understanding of the law that
"[r]amps will have to be installed, doors will have to be widened, bath-
rooms will have to be modified, and in many cases, elevators will have to
be installed" because the regulations "have the force of law" and "[n]o
one is exempt. '1 39 His concern was not that it was required to get done,
131. E.g., 123 CONG. REc. 19,051-52 (1977) (statement of Rep. Jeffords); id. at 37,242,
39,512 (statements of Sen. Randolph).
132. Id. at 37,243.
133. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
134. H.R. REp. No. 1149, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1978).
135. S. REP. No. 890, supra note 112, at 18, 19, 36, 55.
136. 124 CONG. RFc. 13,905 (1978) (statement of Rep. Dodd); id. at 30,318 (statement of
Sen. Williams); id. at 30,332 (statement of Sen. Javits).
137. See supra notes 103-05 & 123 and accompanying text.
138. As ranking minority member of the Subcommittee on Select Education, and as a man-
ager of the 1978 Rehabilitation Act Amendments, Representative Jeffords was required to pay
special attention to § 504 issues as part of his responsibilities.
139. 123 CONG. REc. 19,051 (1977) (emphasis added). Quoting from the preamble to the
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but that "cities and States" would be required "to bear 100 percent of the
costs to carry out the federal mandate."'"
Representative Jeffords participated actively in the 1977 section 504
Implementation Hearings, 14 1 during which he developed greater skepti-
cism concerning the costs of compliance, recognized that these costs
were being exaggerated, and finally allowed that more specific and "tech-
nical answers" were needed. 42 He agreed generally, though, that the
benefits that would accrue from the HEW rule would far exceed the cost.
Questioning David Tatel, the Director of HEW's Office for Civil Rights,
Representative Jeffords noted that HEW had "made a commitment to
full implementation of 504, with which I fully agreed, and enforcement
of it.' 1
43
The Mark-Up Session on H.R. 12407, the House version of the 1978
Amendments, was held on May 9, 1978. At that session, Representative
Jeffords announced a desire to "offer an amendment to say that the Fed-
eral government as well as everyone else will comply with the regulations
which are under Section 504." 14
On May 5, 1978, on the House floor, Representative Jeffords dis-
cussed his amendment to extend section 504 to the Executive, stating
that the bill "should go a long way toward developing a uniform and
equitable national policy for eliminating discrimination."' 145
Representative Jeffords also sponsored amendments regarding the
provision of services to eliminate communication barriers:
Many of those amendments stem from section 504 of the act,
and address 504, and needs which come as a result of that sec-
tion of the act. As a result of section 504 it has become clear to
many that 504 means more than just removing architectural
barriers for the physically handicapped. While this is certainly
a priority goal, there are many other types of disabilities to
which 504 applies and to which attention must be paid. People
who are deaf face communication barriers which are just as
great as the architectural barriers faced by those in
regulation, Representative Jeffords observed that "Secretary Califano said that he intends to
'vigorously enforce'" the regulation. Id.
140. Id. at 19,051.
141. See supra note 84.
142. Id. at 273.
143. Id. at 368.
144. COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, MARK-UP SESSION, H.R. 12,467 AND
H.R. 12,511, at 22 (May 9, 1978) (stenographic transcript) (emphasis added).
145. 124 CONG. REC. 13,603 (1978) (emphasis added).
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wheelchairs. 1
He discussed a number of other similar provisions and then stated:
I must emphasize so that there is no misunderstanding that my
insistence that the Federal Government pay part of the cost is
in no way to negate or minimize the removal of barriers for the
handicapped, or in any way to halt or delay action until the
Federal Government puts up some money. My goal is clear
and it is to get the Federal Government, which made the law,
which wrote the regulations, to pay for at least part of the costs
so that the full burden does not fall on the State or local gov-
ernments or on public or private institutions throughout the
country. 14 7
He then immediately addressed Executive coverage:
Somehow it did not seem right to me that the Federal Govern-
ment should require States and localities to eliminate discrimi-
nation against the handicapped wherever it exists and remain
exempt themselves. So I developed a provision which is in this
conference report that extends coverage of section 504 to in-
clude any function or activity in every department or agency of
the Federal Government.
14
No one disagreed with any of these sentiments. Moments later, the ten
distinct provisions, including section 504 coverage of the Executive, all of
which suggested full congressional awareness of the HEW regulation,
were enacted with near unanimity, as they had been earlier in the
Senate. 149
146. Id. at 38,550 (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 38,551 (emphasis added).
148. Id. (emphasis added); cf Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (it is "unthinkable
that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government").
149. The vote was 81-1 in the Senate, 124 CONG. REc. 30,508 (1978), and 365-62 in the
House, id. at 38,553. Numerous expressions of support for the HEW regulations were also
heard after the President's Task Force on Regulatory Review announced its plenary review of
them. See, eg., 128 CONG. Rac. S4201-02 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1982) (statement of Sen. Cohen);
id. at S4240-41 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1982) (statement of Sen. Weicker); id. at S4245-46 (daily ed.
Apr. 28, 1982) (statement of Sen. Mitchell). After Vice President Bush announced the deci-
sion of the Task Force that the HEW regulation would not be modified, see infra notes 159-67
and accompanying text, the Justice Department insisted on maintaining the right to allow
waivers in its regulations for federally conducted programs. Representative Vento observed
that "the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice took action which contradicts the
Vice President's statement," and that these regulations "ignore congressional intent in passing
the 1978 amendments to section 504 by allowing a broad defense against compliance with the
law if allowing handicapped people to participate in a program would cause 'financial or ad-
ministrative burdens' to the Federal agency." In short, Representative Vento concluded, "re-
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E. The 1980 Department of Justice Regulation
Undertaking an in-depth review of its legal and factual bases, the
Attorney General in 1980 reaffirmed and adopted for his own grantees
the substantive content of the HEW construction that prohibited waivers
and loopholes in the meaningful access guarantee. 150 This action was
consistent with HEW's construction of section 504.
In his Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for his 1980 regulation, the
Attorney General requested comments on the "burdens" issue, request-
ing in particular "the submission of cost studies regarding structural and
nonstructural modifications to provide for the participation of the handi-
capped in programs relevant to this subpart.""15 As a result of his care-
ful analysis of the cost issue concerning architectural and communication
barriers, the Attorney General concluded that no waivers were neces-
sary. He did, however, add a provision permitting small providers of
services to comply with the regulation by referring handicapped persons
to other providers.
1 52
Regarding architectural barriers, the Attorney General determined
that "[w]ith respect to compliance costs associated with structured modi-
fications, it is crucial to keep.., in mind... [that] [s]tructural changes
in existing facilities are required only where there is no other feasible way
to make the recipient's program accessible to handicapped persons." '153
He went on to explain in an appendix to the regulation his understanding
that "accessibility is probably the area of greatest concern to recipients
because of the perceived economic cost associated with the elimination of
cipients of Federal assistance would be held to a lower standard" than the Executive. 129
CONG. REc. E3167 (daily ed. June 23, 1983) (statement of Rep. Vento).
During debate on the Equal Access to Voting Rights Act (which provided a right to
accessible registration facilities and voting polls for handicapped persons in federal elections),
Representative Fish, the sponsor of the Act, inserted into the Record an explanatory statement
which indicated that a substantial number of extant facilities would be available for use al-
ready, thereby minimizing the burdens of the new Act. 129 CONG. REC. H304 (daily ed. Feb.
3, 1983); see also id. at H305 (statement of Rep. Walgren). Such post-enactment legislative
history cannot be accorded the same controlling weight, of course, as contemporaneous stat-
utes and amendments. Yet, it does manifest the same consistent, substantial intent of the
Congress to approve the HEW regulations, and "[a]lthough postenactment developments can-
not be accorded 'the weight of contemporary legislative history, we would be remiss if we
ignored these authoritative expressions concerning the scope and purpose of Title IX."'
North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 535 (1982) (quoting Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 687 n.7 (1979)).
150. 28 C.F.R. §§ 42.501-42.540 (1986).
151. 44 Fed. Reg. 54,958 (1979).
152. 28 C.F.R. § 42.521(c) (1986).
153. 45 Fed. Reg. 37,620-21 (1980).
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such barriers."' 4 But, he determined, "[i]t has been HEW's [three year]
experience that its recipients have erroneously exaggerated the actual
cost of compliance due, in part, to a misunderstanding of the extent to
which structural changes are required under section 504.' 1 The Attor-
ney General explained in a detailed manner the various ways that recipi-
ents of Justice Department funds could comply with the program's
accessibility requirement "to underscore the options available to recipi-
ents for moderating the costs of compliance while providing full program
accessiblity to qualified handicapped persons."'5 6
Similarly, with regard to communication barriers, the Attorney
General set forth additional important factual determinations regarding
the cost issue. "One obvious example of eliminating communications
barriers would be the installation of teletypewriters (TTY's) .... The
cost of a TTY is relatively modest and would be even less so where a
TTY is shared by a number of public agencies hooked up to a central
ITY number." '157 The provision of sign language interpreters in various
settings was also, in the Attorney General's view, an important method
of ameliorating the communications barriers experienced by speaking
and hearing-impaired individuals. He concluded that a "recipient's need
for an interpreter is usually not on a continuing basis, and the overall
compliance cost would not be substantial." ' 8
F The 1983 Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Presidential Task Force on
Regulatory Relief
On February 17, 1981, President Reagan signed Executive Order
No. 12,291.1 s1 Pursuant to that executive order, which covered the
"revie[w] of new as well as existing regulations"'160 the HEW section 504
regulations were subjected to a searching, in-depth, two-year scrutiny to
determine "the need for" them,' 61 whether the approach "chosen" would
"maximize the net benefits to society"' 62 and whether there were "alter-
native approaches.., involving the least net cost to society."' 63 These
154. Id. at 37,629.
155. Id.
156. Id. At 37,629-31.
157. Id. at 37,621.
158. Id.
159. Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 2, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981).
160. Id. § 2.
161. Id. § 2(a).
162. Id. § 2(c).
163. Id. § 2(d).
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determinations were to be made "to the extent permitted by law."",
In a March 21, 1983, letter to Senator Lowell Weicker, Chairperson
of the Subcommittee on the Handicapped, the chairperson of the Task
Force, Vice-President Bush, announced that the Task Force and the Jus-
tice Department had "decided not to issue a revised set of coordination
guidelines" for section 504 grantees.1 65 The letter stated that the deci-
sion was based upon
a lengthy regulatory review process during which the Adminis-
tration examined the existing regulatory structure under
Section 504, studied recent judicial precedents and talked ex-
tensively with Members of Congress and of the handicapped
community. Especially important were the personal views and
experience of those most directly affected by these regulations.
The comments of handicapped individuals, as well as their fam-
ilies, provided an invaluable insight into the impact of the 504
guidelines.
166
Since the Task Force's purpose was to modify HEW's regulation, the
Task Force's considerations and judgments, especially the reaffirmation
of the determinations HEW made when it promulgated its rule in 1977,
supports the wisdom of HEW's consistent, continuing construction.
Senator Weicker stated that the Task Force's decision to leave the
regulation alone was "of great importance to disabled Americans" and
that the "letter comes as a great relief to disabled Americans and all who
advocate for their cause" since "Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is
a cornerstone in the construction of equal rights for the disabled."
'1 67
III. THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF SECTION 504's MEANINGFUL
ACCESS REQUIREMENT
The federal courts have not yet resolved the question of precisely
what role "burdens" should play in limiting the duty to provide disabled
persons meaningful access to federal and federally assisted activities.
While one Supreme Court decision seems to suggest that "burdens" can
be an important consideration, 168 others have indicated that "Congress
apparently determined that it would require ...grantees to bear the
costs" of eliminating barriers that prevented disabled people from partic-
ipating in and benefitting from federal assisted programs "as a quid pro
164. Id. § 2.
165. 129 CONG. REc. S3672 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1983).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412 (1979).
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quo for the receipt of federal funds,"'16 9 and that section 504 "requires
that an otherwise qualified handicapped individual must be provided
with meaningful access to the benefit... offer[ed]."
' 170
One problem with any attempt to make sense of these decisions is
that the Supreme Court has only recently begun to fully consider section
504's legislative and administrative history.1 71 The following sections of
this Article seek to harmonize the court decisions in light of that history
and to show that HEW's construction of section 504 is correct.
A. The Case Law Supporting the Meaningful Access
Approach of the HEW Rule
It has been judicially recognized that the HEW regulation was the
end-product of "a series of compromises," 17z a result of "years of discus-
sions and negotiations among all interested parties." 173 Although neither
the disabled community 7 a nor HEW's grantees17 1 were ecstatic with the
regulation, everyone recognized that the regulation was fair. The regula-
tion promulgated by HEW thus reflects a conscious effort to guarantee
handicapped persons an equal opportunity to participate in federally
assisted programs but at the same time to avoid the imposition of prohib-
itively expensive or impractical burdens.1 76 That is perhaps the reason
why, eight years later, the Supreme Court was able to state that it was
"unaware of any case challenging the facial validity of these
regulations."'
177
The Supreme Court has now enthusiastically approved the HEW
regulation and, in particular, the regulation's program accessibility sec-
tion and its prohibition of waivers and exceptions. In its earliest con-
169. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 633 n.13 (1984).
170. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985) (emphasis added).
171. Indeed, until the Consolidated, Alexander and Arline decisions corrected erroneous
dictum from Davis, see supra notes 11, 48, 53-54, 109 and infra notes 172-96 and accompany-
ing text, it was unclear what if any weight was to be given the pre-enactment legislative history
of § 504 or the legislative history of the 1974 and 1978 amendments to § 504.
172. 1977 Section 504 Implementation Hearings, supra note 84, at 241.
173. 123 CONG. REc. 12,410 (1977) (letter from Sen. Cranston to HEW Secretary
Califano).
174. 1977 Section 504 Implementation Hearings, supra note 84, at 33 (regulation "repre-
sents a leniency that the National Center for Law and the Handicapped does not necessarily
agree with"); id. at 36 ("The concept of program accessibility found in these final regulations is
a compromise. It allows for the consideration of the financial buden [sic] on the recipient in
fashioning a remedy .... "); id. at 254 ("these regulations do not contain everything handi-
capped citizens would have wanted").
175. E.g., id. at 4-10 (testimony of John W. Adams, Council of Chief State School Officers).
176. See supra notes 74-89 and accompanying text.
177. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 297 n.17 (1985).
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struction of section 504, Southeastern Community College v. Davis,178 the
Court proceeded on the basis that the HEW rule was proper.1 79 Indeed,
one court recently ruled that "[t]o advance the inquiry whether unwill-
ingness to accommodate amounts to discrimination, Davis instructs that
the administrative regulations implementing section 504 should be
examined." 1 0
In Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone,i s' the Court determined that
section 504 applied to all employment discrimination by recipients of fed-
eral assistance. It based its decision on the HEW regulation. The Court
approved the HEW regulation in its substantive requirements, not merely
its procedural requirements. The unanimous Court held: "The [HEW
section 504] regulations particularly merit deference in the present case:
the responsible congressional Committees participated in their formula-
tion, and both these Committees and Congress itself endorsed the regula-
tions in their final form."' 2 Leaving no room for misinterpretation, the
Court emphasized that "[i]n adopting § 505(a)(2) in the amendments of
1978, Congress incorporated the substance of the Department's [§ 504]
regulations into the statute."'8 3 Thus, the Supreme Court, in affirming
178. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
179. The Court in Davis did not dispute the Secretary's authority to promulgate regulations
under § 504. The Court stated, however, that "[f]or the first three years after the section was
enacted, HEW maintained the position that Congress had not intended any regulations to be
issued." Davis, 442 U.S. at 412 n.11. The Court further stated that the agency "altered its
stand only after having been enjoined to do so." Id. (citing the district court's ruling in Cherry
v. Matthews, 419 F. Supp. 922, 924 (D.D.C. 1976)).
However, as the Solicitor General informed the Court in 1981:
We know of no basis for the court's remarks concerning HEW's perception of its
obligations under Section 504. It is our understanding that issuance of the Section
504 regulations was delayed not because HEW did not believe such regulations
should be issued, but because development of the regulations was a difficult and time-
consuming process.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 20, University of Texas v. Camenish, 451 U.S.
390 (1981); see also 1976 Rehabilitation of the Handicapped Programs, supra note 106, part 1,
at 347 ("process of preparing the proposed regulation for section 504 has been time-consuming
for a number of reasons"). In School Board v. Arline, the Supreme Court finally acknowledged
this fact, correcting its earlier statement in Davis. 107 S.Ct. 1123, 1126 n.3 (1987).
180. Nelson v. Thornburgh, 567 F. Supp. 369, 379 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd, 732 F.2d 147 (3d
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1985).
181. 465 U.S. 624 (1984).
182. Id. at 634.
183. Id. at 634 n.15 (emphasis added). This Article previously listed the ten statutory un-
dertakings of the Congress in the 1978 section 504 amendments. See supra notes 107-19 and
accompanying text. The court's confused statement in Disabled in Action of Pennsylvania v.
Pierce, 606 F. Supp. 310, 316 (E.D. Pa. 1985), that the 1978 amendments incorporate only that
provision of the HEW regulation that adopts the remedies, procedures and rights of Title VI,
arose because that court misread "the substance of the Department's [§ 504] regulations" as if
it read "incorporates the substance of the Department's [Title VI] regulation." The latter is
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the decision of the court of appeals in Le Strange v. Consolidated Rail
Corp., not only approved the Third Circuit's close attention to HEW's
"recently issued regulations," and the circuit court's holding that
"[tihese regulations are particularly noteworthy because HEW was as-
signed the task, by executive order, of coordinating the issuance of regu-
lations enforcing § 504 by all federal departments and agencies," 184 but
also adopted the lower court's view that the Congress had in the 1978
amendments approved the HEW regulation."' 5
In Alexander v. Choate, the Supreme Court's second plenary expla-
nation of the meaning of section 504, the Court "recognized these regula-
tions as an important source of guidance on the meaning of § 504," and
noted that the Congress had made clear that "those charged with ad-
ministering the Act had substantial leeway to explore areas in which dis-
crimination against the handicapped posed particularly significant
problems and to devise regulations to prohibit such discrimination."' 86
The Court concluded that the "elimination of architectural barriers was
one of the central aims" of Congress in enacting section 504 and, thus,
those barriers must constitute particularly significant problems within
the meaning of Alexander.
1 1
7
Furthermore, the Court specifically quoted with obvious approval
the very provision of the HEW regulation that permitted no waivers.
The Court expressly stated that the "regulations implementing § 504 are
consistent with the view that reasonable adjustments in the nature of the
benefit offered must at times be made to assure meaningful access," and
expressed approval of section 84.22, which it described as "requiring that
... existing facilities eventually be operated so that a program or activity
inside is, 'when viewed in its entirety,' readily accessible."' 8
In Alexander, the Court relied upon the HEW regulation through-
out, analyzed the legislative history, and observed that "[i]n enacting the
Rehabilitation Act and in subsequent amendments, Congress did focus
on several substantive areas-employment, education, and the elimina-
tion of physical barriers to access-in which it considered the societal
and personal costs of refusals to provide meaningful access to the handi-
plainly not a correct reading since the holding in Consolidated is that the substance of the
Title VI regulation (which excluded employment from its coverage) was not incorporated by
the Congress.
184. 687 F.2d 767, 774 (3d Cir. 1982), afid, 465 U.S. 624 (1984) (emphasis added).
185. Consolidated, 465 U.S. at 637.
186. 469 U.S. at 304 n.24 (1985) (emphasis added).
187. Id. at 297.
188. Id. at 301 n.21 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 84.22(a) (1986)).
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capped to be particularly high." '189 Thus, the Court concluded that a
qualified handicapped individual "must be provided with meaningful ac-
cess to the benefit that the grantee offers." 190
The Court stated in a footnote that "a grantee need not be required
to make 'fundamental' or 'substantial' modifications to accommodate the
handicapped."'191 However, the Court explained that such modifications
rise to the level of being "fundamental" or "substantial" only if they
threaten to vitiate the very "integrity of their programs," or compromise
"the essential nature" of those programs. 192
Most recently, in School Board v. Arline,193 the Supreme Court
reemphasized that the HEW rule is "of significant assistance" in inter-
preting section 504 since "these regulations were drafted with the over-
sight and approval of Congress."' 19 4 The amendments to section 504, the
Court observed, "reflected Congress' concern with protecting the handi-
capped against discrimination stemming not only from simple prejudice,
but from 'archaic attitudes and laws' and from 'the fact that the Ameri-
can people are simply unfamiliar with and insensitive to the difficulties
confront[ing] individuals with handicaps.' "19 Thus, "[i]n enacting and
amending the Act, Congress enlisted all programs receiving federal funds
in an effort 'to share with handicapped Americans the opportunities for
an education, transportation, housing, health care, and jobs that other
Americans take for granted.' "196
Similar to the Supreme Court's interpretation of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the HEW regulation takes a common sense approach
while insuring "meaningful access." Indeed, the Alexander Court explic-
itly relied upon its leading decision construing Title VI, Lau v. Nich-
ols, 19 7 for its holding that section 504 requires that "handicapped
individual[s] must be provided with meaningful access to the benefit that
the grantee offers."' 198 In Lau, the Court had ruled that the provision of
189. Id. at 306-07 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
190. Id. at 301 (emphasis added).
191. Alexander, 469 U.S. at 300 & n. 20.
192. Id. at 300.
193. 107 S.Ct. 1123 (1987).
194. Id. at 1127 (citing Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 634-35 & nn. 14-
16 (1984)); see also id. at 1126 n.3 (noting that the 1974 Rehabilitation Act amendments
stemmed from Congress' review of HEW's "attempt to devise regulations to implement the
Act").
195. Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1126 (quoting S. REp. No. 1297, supra note 50, at 50).
196. Id. (quoting 123 CONG. Rc. 13,515 (1977) (statement of Sen. Humphrey)).
197. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
198. Alexander, 469 U.S. at 301.
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education solely in English to non-English-speaking students violated Ti-
tle VI. The lower court had opined that:
[T]he determination of what special educational difficulties
faced by some students within a State or School District will be
afforded extraordinary curative action, and the intensity of the
measures to be taken, is a complex decision, calling for signifi-
cant executive and legislative expertise and non-judicial value
judgments....
... States should be free to set their educational policies,
including special programs to meet special needs, with limited
judicial intervention to decide among competing demands upon
the resources at their command .... 199
The Supreme Court reversed, ordering that "meaningful access" to
educational services be provided, observing that the students in Lau "ask
only that the Board of Education be directed to apply its expertise to the
problem and rectify the situation" as required by Title VI,2° and held
that "there is no equality of treatment merely by providing students with
the same facilities, textbooks, teachers, and curriculum; for students who
do not understand English are effectively foreclosed from any meaningful
education."2 1 The Court further concluded: "It seems obvious that the
Chinese-speaking minority receives fewer benefits than the English-
speaking majority from respondents' school system which denies them a
meaningfil opportunity to participate in the educational program
"202
Moreover, Justice White recently observed that the students' claim
in Lau, upon which "[tihis Court, reversing the Court of Appeals, gave
199. Lau v. Nichols, 483 F.2d 791, 799 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 414 U.S. 563 (1974). Judge
Hufstedler, writing in dissent, stated: "Access to education offered by the public schools is
completely foreclosed to these children who cannot comprehend any of it. They are function-
ally deaf and mute." Id. at 805 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting). "[D]iscrimination is not washed
away because the able bodied and the paraplegic are given the same state command to walk."
Id. at 806 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
200. Lau, 414 U.S. at 565 (emphasis added).
201. Id. at 566.
202. Id. at 568. Akin to Lau's analysis of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is Chief
Justice Burger's analysis of Title VII of that Act in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971). Construing a plain statutory mandate against discrimination in employment, the Chief
Justice wrote:
Congress has now provided that tests or criteria for employment or promotion
may not provide equality of opportunity merely in the sense of the fabled offer of
milk to the stork and the fox. On the contrary, Congress has now required that the
posture and condition of the job-seeker be taken into account. It has-to resort again
to the fable-provided that the vessel in which the milk is proffered be one all seekers
can use.
Id at 431 (emphasis added).
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relief under Title VI,"2 3 was that the students "should be taught
the English language, that instructions should proceed in Chinese, or that
some other way be provided to afford them equal educational
opportunity.
' 204
Just as school districts need not build new schools in minority or
white neighborhoods to remedy race discrimination that violates Title
VI, but may use student reassignment and transportation as remedies,20 5
the HEW regulation does not require every building in a program to be
accessible so long as the benefits of the program are made available to
handicapped persons. It is permissible to choose the least expensive
means of providing racial or ethnic minorities or handicapped persons
"meaningful access" to federal or federally assisted activities, but under
Alexander, Lau, and Guardians, a means that does so must be chosen.
As the court of appeals concluded in Lloyd v. Regional Transporta-
203. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 593 (1983).
204. Id. (emphasis added). In Alexander, the Court recognized as a "basic premise" that
"the evolution of Title VI regulatory and judicial law is... relevant to ascertaining the in-
tended scope of § 504." 469 U.S. at 293 n.7. See also Community Television v. Gottfried, 459
U.S. 498, 509 (1983); Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1128. As the Senate Report accompanying the 1974
amendments states, "Section 504 was patterned after and is almost identical to" Title VI. S.
REP. No. 1297, supra note 50, at 39-40.
A key event affecting Title VI regulatory and judicial law was the Supreme Court's ruling
in Lau. In Lau, the Court recognized that expensive aids and services would sometimes be
necessary to eliminate the language and communications barriers affecting some ethnic minori-
ties and to provide them effective and meaningful access to federally assisted services. 414 U.S.
at 566-68. Lau, like the federal regulations enforcing Title VI relied upon in that decision,
permitted no waivers to this requirement.
Lau was decided a few months before the 1974 amendments to section 504 were enacted.
It can be assumed that Congress was aware of such contemporaneous decisions under Title VI
affecting the scope of section 504. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 612
F.2d 644, 649 & n.5 (2d Cir. 1979).
Although, of course, there are some "distinctions between Title VI and § 504," Alexan-
der, 469 U.S. at 294 & n.ll, the Court ruled the coverage of § 504 was intended to be broader
than Title VI, in that the latter statute was held in Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463
U.S. 582 (1983), not to reach more than intentional discrimination. See also Arline, 107 S. Ct.
at 1126 n.2. In Alexander, the Court specifically relied upon the "meaningful access" require-
ment as set forth inLau. 469 U.S. at 301 n.21. Moreover, in Alexander, the Court relied upon
the government's concession there that "special measures for the handicapped, as the Lau case
shows, may sometimes be necessary." Id.
205. Cf Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25-31 (1971). It is
doubtful, though, that if upheld, a general undue burdens defense could be confined to disabil-
ity discrimination. It could also affect, for example, the requirement in Title IX of the Educa-
tion Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, that federal grantees provide meaningful access
to their educational programs without regard to gender, if the remedy involved, for example,
the provision of additional locker space for female athletes. The defense might also affect the
requirement under Title VI acknowledged in Lau, 414 U.S. at 566-69, that meaningful access
must be provided to minorities by eliminating language barriers.
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tion Authority,2 "6 section 504 "establishes affirmative rights."'207 Ruling
that "Lau is dispositive" of the content of those rights, Judge Cummings
paraphrased Justice Douglas' opinion in Lau as follows: "'Under these
[federal] standards there is no equality of treatment merely by providing
[the handicapped] with the same facilities [as ambulatory persons]... ;
for [handicapped persons] who [can] not [gain access to such facilities]
are effectively foreclosed from any meaningful [public
transportation].' 208
The HEW regulation, which also relied upon Lau,20 9 "deserve[s]
particular deference," in view of its resolution of the important "quasi-
legislative compromise between competing interests,"21 0 and in view of
the "extended rule-making process carried out in 1976 and 1977, ''21 1 re-
sulting in "regulations [that] reflect a conscious effort at balancing the
needs of the handicapped with the budgetary realities of programs receiv-
ing federal funds." '212
As previously discussed,213 the Congress took ten discrete, legislative
actions that indicated its awareness and approval of the waiverless HEW
regulatory approach. 'Judge Pollak recently pointed to just one of these
provisions, 214 and concluded that "the 1978 amendments to the Act
strongly suggest that Congress was well aware that compliance with sec-
tion 504 could be costly.
215
Courts have viewed the Senate Report on the 1978 amendments as
206. 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977).
207. Id. at 1281.
208. Id. at 1284 (quoting Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566 (1974)) (bracketed material
added by the court of appeals).
209. The Secretary's section-by-section analysis specifically cited and relied upon Lau v.
Nichols. Discussing the term "equally effective" appearing in 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(2), the Sec-
retary explained that that term was
intended to encompass the concept of equivalent, as opposed to identical, services
and to acknowledge the fact that, in order to meet the individual needs of handi-
capped persons to the same extent that the corresponding needs of nonhandicapped
persons are met, adjustments to regular programs or the provision of different pro-
grams may sometimes be necessary. For example, a welfare office that uses the tele-
phone for communicating with its clients must provide alternative modes of
communicating with its deaf clients. This standard parallels the one established
under title VI of Civil Rights Act of 1964 with respect to the provision of educational
services to students whose primary language is not English. See Lau v. Nichols, 414
U.S. 563 (1974).
42 Fed. Reg. 22,687 (1977).
210. Nelson, 567 F. Supp. at 379-80.
211. Id. at 379.
212. Id. at 379 & n.19.
213. See supra notes 107-19 and accompanying text.
214. 29 U.S.C. § 775(a)(2) (1982).
215. Nelson, 567 F. Supp. at 380.
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particularly important. That Report "explicitly referred to, and ap-
proved, the regulations promulgated under § 504." 216 The "Congress ex-
pressed no disapproval of the regulations defining reasonable
accommodation and undue burden." '217 "No member of the House or
Senate committee raised any question regarding § 504's... coverage.
'218
"The committee report contains nothing that would indicate it felt HEW
exceeded its statutory authority ... in its recently promulgated regula-
tions. Similarly, no one during the debate in the Senate or House sug-
gested HEW had gone too far. '219 The 1978 amendments, in short,
"demonstrate[ ] a widespread understanding on the part of Congress" of
the content of the HEW regulations. 220 "Congress was very much aware
of HEW's interpretation. ' 221 As the Court concluded in Consolidated,
"[tihe regulations particularly merit deference in the present case: the
responsible congressional Committees participated in their formulation,
and both these Committees and Congress itself endorsed the regulations
in their final form.
222
The deference owed to an agency's prior construction of a statute "is
particularly appropriate where ... an agency's interpretation involves
issues of considerable public controversy, and Congress has not acted to
correct any misperception. 22 3 Where "an agency's statutory construc-
tion has been 'fully brought to the attention of the public and the Con-
gress,' and the latter has not sought to alter that interpretation although
it has amended the statute in other respects, then presumably the legisla-
tive intent has been correctly discerned." 2" The Court has stated:
Subsequent legislation declaring the intent of an earlier statute
is entitled to great weight in statutory construction. And here
this principle is given special force by the equally venerable
principle that the construction of a statute by those charged
216. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1028 (1984) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall &
Stevens, JJ., dissenting). The dissent in Smith has become particularly important in view of
the recent action by the Congress explicitly overruling that decision and adopting the position
of Justice Brennan's dissent. "As it turned out, Justice Brennan was more attuned to the
intention of Congress than were the six justices in the Smith majority." Board of Educ. v.
Diamond, 808 F.2d 987, 993 (3d Cir. 1986).
217. Nelson, 567 F. Supp. at 380.
218. Smith, 468 U.S. at 1028 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall & Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
See supra note 216.
219. Le Strange v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 687 F.2d 767, 774 (3d Cir. 1982), aff'd, 465
U.S. 624 (1984).
220. Id. at 776.
221. Smith, 468 U.S. at 1027 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall & Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
222. Consolidated, 465 U.S. at 634.
223. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 554 & n.10 (1979).
224. Id. at 544 n.10 (quoting Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 489 (1940)).
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with its execution should be followed unless there are com-
pelling indications that it is wrong, especially when Congress
has ... not just kept its silence by refusing to overturn the
administrative construction, but has ratified it with positive
legislation.2
The Supreme Court thought that an unusually strong case of legisla-
tive acquiescence and ratification occurred in Bob Jones University v.
United States, where Congress also had held hearings "on this precise
issue" that the regulation concerned.2 26 The Ninety-Fifth Congress did
much more than hold hearings on section 504. From the day they ar-
rived at the Capitol, through both sessions and through the enactment of
ten distinct provisions of the 1978 amendments, they were continuously
concerned with the regulation. As in Bob Jones, "[i]t is hardly conceiva-
ble that Congress-and in this setting, any Member of Congress-was
not abundantly aware of what was going on.
' 227
B. The Case Law Relied Upon by the Department of Justice for a
Broader "Burdens" Defense
Despite the approval of the HEW construction by the Congress and
the Supreme Court, the Department of Justice promulgated a new regu-
lation in 1984 covering that agency's own activities. The 1984 rule, con-
trary to the HEW approach, absolved federal agencies from the
obligation to take "any action" which they deem too burdensome.228
The principal argument in support of this exception to section 504 is
that Davis229 required it. As the Department of Justice stated in its sec-
tion-by-section analysis of its 1984 rule:
The "undue financial and administrative burdens" language is
based on the Supreme Court's Davis holding that section 504
does not require program modifications that result in a funda-
mental alteration in the nature of a program, and on the
Court's statement that section 504 does not require modifica-
tions that would result in "undue financial and administrative
burdens.
'z30
The text of the "burdens" passage in Davis, from which the Justice De-
225. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-82 (1969) (footnotes omitted).
226. 461 U.S. 574, 600 (1983).
227. Id. at 600-01.
228. 28 C.F.R. §§ 39.150(a)(2), 39.160(d) (1986).
229. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
230. 49 Fed. Reg. 35,729-30 (1984) (quoting Southeastern Community College v. Davis,
442 U.S. 397, 412 (1979)).
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partment's rule was derived is quite different, however: "Technological
advances can be expected to enhance opportunities to rehabilitate the
handicapped or otherwise to qualify them for some useful employment.
Such advances also may enable attainment of these goals without impos-
ing undue financial and administrative burdens upon a State.
'2 31
This statement may have been only an observation by the Court,
intended simply as discourse. This possibility becomes apparent by read-
ing the quotation in context rather than with the gloss placed upon the
passage by the Attorney General's analysis. The "Court's statement"
was not "that section 504 does not require modifications that would re-
sult in 'undue financial and administrative burdens.' "232 Absent the
metaphrasing, the passage can fairly be read as simple digression, a reas-
suring statement for grantees perhaps, that technological advances even-
tually may make it less burdensome for them to comply with section 504.
Moreover, the Davis language was in any event not the holding of
the case, but merely "the Court's statement," as the Attorney General
has had to acknowledge.233 The discussion of "burdens" was not neces-
sary to the decision in the case, and thus was pure obiter dictum.234 The
Court concluded that the plaintiff in that case, Davis, was not an other-
wise qualified handicapped individual.235 The "burdens" passage added
nothing to the result.
236
231. Davis, 442 U.S. at 412.
232. 49 Fed. Reg. 35,730 (1984) (quoting Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442
U.S. 397, 412 (1979)).
233. Id.
234. The discernable congressional interpretation of Davis is consistent with this view. Not-
ing that "the Court emphasized that schools may not exclude a handicapped applicant solely
because of disability," Representative Simon stated on the floor of the House that "[w]e must
be careful not to read the Court's decision into situations beyond the specific facts of the case.
The Davis ruling is a limited decision and should not be interpreted broadly." 125 CONG. REC.
16,247 (1979). Moreover, on August 17, 1979, Senator Cranston sent a letter to the President
regarding Davis, and a copy of the letter appeared in the September 14, 1979 Congressional
Record. 125 CONG. Rc. 24,707 (1979). Senator Cranston reported:
On July 18, I convened in the Senate offices a meeting of officials from the De-
partments of Health, Education, and Welfare, Labor, the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission, Justice, your domestic policy staff, and various Congressional
offices for the purpose of discussing the implications of the Davis case .... The
meeting was very well attended. There seemed to be a clear consensus among all the
participants that, from a legal standpoint, the Davis decision on its particular facts
could and should be carefully analyzed and probably had only a rather narrow appli-
cation insofar as title V protections are concerned.
Id.
235. Davis, 442 U.S. at 406, 407.
236. Such language binds no other courts but is merely a "statement of law in the opinion
which could not logically be a major premise of the selected facts of the decision." R. CRoss,
PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 80 (2d ed. 1968).
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The "burdens" statement may have arisen simply from the Court's
earlier determination that section 504 does not require "fundamental al-
teration[s] in the nature of a program"2 a7 or substantial modifications of
standards. The Attorney General stated in his 1984 analysis that "in
some situations, certain accommodations for a handicapped person may
so alter an agency's program or activity.., that the refusal to undertake
the accommodations is not discriminatory. 238 This is an unexceptional
proposition, reflecting, in fact, the holding in Davis. That holding does
not necessarily require a rule that permits "burdens" to nullify the duty
to provide meaningful access, however.
The "burdens" statement also may have been derived from the Sec-
retary's preamble to the HEW regulation. In that preamble, the Secre-
tary stated that it was "clear that factors of burden and cost had to be
taken into account in the regulation." '239 This was the first statement of
its type that had appeared on any administrative or legislative record.
In Davis, the Court showed that it was well-acquainted with the
HEW regulation. Having determined that Ms. Davis was not qualified
for the position in question, the Court stated that "regulations promul-
gated by HEW... to interpret § 504 reinforce... this conclusion. '2 40 It
then cited the definition of "qualified" in section 84.3(k)(3) of the regula-
tion and quoted extensively from the Secretary's section-by-section anal-
ysis."' The opinion also quoted at length from section 84.44 of the
regulation, which, the Court agreed, "require[d] covered institutions to
make 'modifications' in their programs to accommodate handicapped
persons, and to provide 'auxiliary aids' such as sign-language interpret-
ers"--apparently with no possibility of waiver or exemption-but con-
cluded that "§ 84.44 does not encompass the kind of curricular changes
that would be necessary to accommodate respondent. 24 3 The Court's
conclusion was made not because of any "burden" that would be im-
posed but because the changes would have fundamentally altered the na-
ture of the program.
The Court iff Davis continued to defer to HEW's judgment: "Iden-
tification of those instances where a refusal to accommodate the needs of
a disabled person amounts to discrimination against the handicapped
237. Davis, 442 U.S. at 410.
238. 49 Fed. Reg. 35,729-30 (1984) (quoting Southeastern Community College v. Davis,
442 U.S. 397, 412 (1979)).
239. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,676 (1977).
240. Davis, 442 U.S. at 406.
241. Id. at 406-07 & n.7.
242. Id. at 408-09 & n.9.
243. Id. at 409.
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continues to be an important responsibility of HEW." 2' Given the
Court's obvious familiarity with the regulation, it is quite possible that it
was simply acknowledging the Secretary's statement in the preamble on
"burdens" and not carving out a major exception to section 504. The
Court may have been echoing, and probably approving, the Secretary's
and Congress' judgment that burdens from the regulation and technolog-
ical advances are closely conjoined. Davis did not suspend the "attain-
ment of th[e] goals,"2" 5 but reinforced their attainment by approving the
HEW rule.
246
The "undue financial and administrative burdens" language of Davis
was repeated, again in dictum and without any analysis of its origin, in a
footnote in Arline.2 "7 Unlike the Davis dictum, the Arline dictum ap-
pears at first blush to indicate that the Court may be inclined to adopt a
244. Id. at 423 (emphasis added).
245. Id. at 412.
246. The "burdens" statement also may be rooted in concepts of comity and federalism. It
is possible that the language was meant to be limited to only those requirements that imposed
"undue financial and administrative burdens upon a State" Id. (emphasis added). In
Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, the Supreme Court cautioned against imposi-
tion of "congressional policy on a State involuntarily" and "implici[t] attempt[s] to impose
massive financial obligations on the States." 451 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1981).
While the states of course may be recipients of federal assistance for the purposes of § 504,
"given their constitutional role, the States are not like any other class of recipients of federal
aid." Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246 (1985). Thus, it is certainly possi-
ble that the Davis court, by using the qualifying phrase "upon a State," anticipated Atas-
cadero's holding that the eleventh amendment bars federal suits under § 504 against the states.
In the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Congress overruled Atascadero and pro-
vided individuals the right to sue the states in federal court to enforce § 504 and to enforce
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.
Pub. L. No. 99-506, § 1003, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (No. 10).
247. The footnote states:
"An otherwise qualified person is one who is able to meet all of a program's require-
ments in spite of his handicap." Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S.
397, 406 (1979). In the employment context, an otherwise qualified person is one
who can perform "the essential functions" of the job in question. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)
(1985). When a handicapped person is not able to perform the essential functions of
the job, the court must also consider whether any "reasonable accommodation" by
the employer would enable the handicapped person to perform those functions. Ibid.
Accommodation is not reasonable if it either imposes "undue financial and adminis-
trative burdens" on a grantee, Southeastern Comunity College v. Davis, supra, at 412,
99 S. Ct. at 2730, or requires "a fundamental alteration in the nature of [the] pro-
gram" id. at 410. See 45 CFR § 84.12(c) (1985) (listing factors to consider in deter-
mining whether accommodation would cause undue hardship); 45 CFR pt. 84, App.
A, p. 315 (1985) ("where reasonable accommodation does not overcome the effects of
a person's handicap to the employer, or where reasonable accommodation causes
undue hardship to the employer, failure to hire or promote the handicapped person
will not be considered discrimination"); Davis, supra, at 410-13, 99 S. Ct., at 2369-70;
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S., at 299-301, and n.19, 105 S. Ct., at 720, and n.19;
Strathie v. Department of Transportation, [716 F.2d 227, 231 (3d Cir. 1983)].
107 S. Ct. at 1123, 1131 n.17 (1987).
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broader "burdens" exception than that incorporated in the HEW regula-
tion, as advocated by the Department of Justice in its 1984 rule.
The Arline dictum's applicability was limited by the Court's own
terms, however, to "the employment context. ' 248 Because Arline con-
cerned only employment discrimination, the opinion only discussed
HEW's employment regulation,249 which itself explicitly permits an ex-
ception for "undue hardship"25 and permits such considerations as the
"cost of the accommodation needed ' 251 in some cases to nullify the right
to obtain employment in a federally assisted program because it would
impose such a hardship.252
This undue hardship exception appears only in the employment sub-
part of the HEW rule.25 It was incorporated into the employment pro-
visions, according to the Secretary's section-by-section analysis,2 54 in
order to make HEW's employment regulation consistent with the previ-
ously issued Department of Labor regulation enforcing section 503 of the
Rehabilitation Act,255 which is limited in its coverage to handicap em-
ployment discrimination. Congress intended this uniformity.
256
The 1978 Rehabilitation Act amendments also provide support for
HEW's unique treatment of employment. As discussed above, Senator
McClure's amendment authorized waivers based upon cost in the context
of discrimination in employment only, and a broader waiver was explic-
itly considered and rejected by the Senate.257
248. Id.
249. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.11-84.14 (1986).
250. Id. § 84.12(a).
251. Id. § 84.12(c)(3).
252. Id. § 84.12(c).
253. Compare id. §§ 84.11-84.14 (subpt. B) (employment) with id. §§ 84.21-84.23 (subpt. C)
(program accessibility), id. §§ 84.31-84.38 (subpt. D) (elementary and secondary education),
id. §§ 84.41-84.47 (subpt. E) (postsecondary education) and Id. §§ 84.51-84.55 (subpt. F)
(health, welfare and social services).
254. See 42 Fed. Reg. 22,688 (1977).
255. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1982).
256. See 1974 U.S. Senate Subcomm. on the Handicapped Hearings, supra note 49, at 12; S.
REP. No. 1297, supra note 50. The undue hardship language in the § 503 regulation, in turn,
can be traced to Representative Quie's amendment to § 503 limiting the obligations under that
section-but not § 504-to larger contractors otherwise "it would cause an undue hardship for
them." 119 CONG. REC. 7136 (1973).
257. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. HEW's less rigorous treatment of employ-
ment concerns might also be explained because, in this country's legal system, access to em-
ployment is not considered as important as access to other government and federally assisted
programs. Compare Koelfgen v. Jackson, 355 F. Supp. 243 (D. Minn. 1972) (employment),
aff'd, 410 U.S. 976 (1973) with, eg., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (elementary and secon-
dary education); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950)
(postsecondary education).
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The Arline dictum connected accommodations with qualifications.
It is only "[w]hen a handicapped person is not able to perform the essen-
tial functions of the job" due to his or her handicap that "the court must
also consider whether any 'reasonable accommodation' by the employer
would enable the handicapped person to perform those functions."258
Only at the second stage of this process does the question of "burdens"
arise. It is important to recognize, however, that HEW's definition of
"qualified handicapped person" differs substantially from subpart to sub-
part of the regulation.2 59 The subpart dealing with employment defines
that term to include only "handicapped persons who, with reasonable
accommodations, can perform the essential functions of the job in ques-
tion."2z 0 Obviously, in the employment context, a person's handicap
may have the effect of interfering with a person's job qualifications. The
same is not true, however, for the purposes of benefiting from public
services, and so handicapped persons are deemed by the regulation to be
"qualified" for such services if they meet "the essential eligibility require-
ments for the receipt of such services." '61 For services such as recrea-
tional facilities, where there are no eligibility requirements, or where
those requirements consist of such criteria as indigency or residency, a
person's handicap, logically, can never have the effect of interfering with
the qualifications for receipt of those services.
Similarly, for the purposes of participating in elementary and secon-
dary education programs, handicapped children are deemed "qualified"
by the HEW rule so long as they are within the proper ages of eligibil-
ity.262 Unlike the area of employment, a child's handicap cannot itself
have the effect of rendering a child unqualified for primary and secon-
dary educational programs.
As stated by the court in Dopico v. Goldschmidt,263 section 504 does
not demand that
the physical qualifications for the job of bus driver or motor-
man be altered so that the handicapped are not excluded. The
existing barriers to the "participation" of the wheelchair-bound
[sic] are incidental to the design of facilities and the allocation
of services, rather than integral to the nature of public trans-
portation itself, just as a flight of stairs is incidental to a law
258. Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1131 n.17 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k) (1985)).
259. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k) (1986).
260. Id. § 84.3(k)(1); see Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1131 n.17.
261. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(4) (1986).
262. Id. § 84.3(k)(2).
263. 687 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1982).
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school's construction but has no bearing on the ability of an
otherwise qualified handicapped student to study law.
214
Thus, under the order of analysis suggested by the Arline dictum
and under the HEW rule itself, the burdens issue would not arise when
the issue is the exclusion of handicapped citizens from public services or
educational activities or other programs universally available to all citi-
zens. By contrast, eligibility for employment programs is based upon
individual qualifications, and in that context "the physical effect of one's
handicap" could interfere with a person's employment qualifications. 65
Courts that have given thoughtful scrutiny to the language of sec-
tion 504 and its legislative history have honored Congress' intent, sup-
ported the HEW approach, and rejected the one urged by the
Department of Justice. For example, in Georgia Association for Retarded
Citizens v. McDaniel, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled, on the
basis of "§ 504's broad recognition of the impermissibility of the 'denial'
of 'benefits,'" that disabled people seeking relief under section 504 need
only show that they "would benefit from" the program that has excluded
them and that they seek the same "scope of services" provided the rest of
us "as envisioned by Davis. ' 266 Significantly, the Department of Justice
filed an amicus brief in McDaniel arguing that the programming re-
quested constituted an "undue burden" on the educational system and
thus was not required by section 504. The circuit court objurgatorily
rejected the Department of Justice's position in a footnote stating "It]he
United States, invited to file a brief as amicus curiae has blown hot, cold
and hot as to the coverage under Section 504.
"1267
264. Id. at 653. Dopico was cited with approval in Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300
n.20 (1985).
265. Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1129 n.10. The citation of Southeastern Community College v.
Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979), a postsecondary education case, in support of the "burdens" dic-
tum in footnote 17 of Arline, is consistent with this analysis since a handicapped person's
participation in a postsecondary education program (except in a program that offers open
admissions) is, like employment, based upon individual qualifications to meet "academic and
technical standards." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(3) (1986); see Davis, 442 U.S. at 406-07.
The fact that HEW nonetheless chose to incorporate an "undue hardship" provision in
the employment subpart of its regulation, but not in the postsecondary education subpart,
reflects the Secretary'sfactual administrative determination that no such waiver was necessary
outside of the employment context. See supra notes 74-89 and accompanying text.
266. 716 F.2d 1565, 1580 (11th Cir. 1983), vacated on other grounds, 468 U.S. 1213 (1984)
(emphasis in original); accord Camenisch v. University of Tex., 616 F.2d 127, 133 (5th Cir.
1980), vacated on other grounds, 451 U.S. 390 (1981) ("Southeastern Community College says
only that section 504 does not require [recipients of federal funds] to provide services to a
handicapped individual for a program for which the individual's handicap precludes him from
ever realizing the principal benefit").
267. McDaniel, 716 F.2d at 1580 n.15. The final "hot" referred to a Department of Educa-
tion policy memorandum that was provided to the court by plaintiffs' attorneys. See also
1518
June 1987] DISABILITY RIGHTS SYMPOSIUM 1519
In its 1984 regulatory revision, the Department of Justice heavily
relied upon the mass transportation cases, American Public Transit Asso-
ciation v. Lewis268 and its progeny. Regardless of the correctness of these
rulings, 269 they do not speak directly to the issue. The Lewis decision
invalidated only the mass transit provisions of a Department of Trans-
portation regulation requiring accessible mass transit systems.270
Although Lewis cast some doubt on the validity of the HEW coordina-
tion regulation's mass transit provision,271 it did not invalidate it.272 The
Departments of Justice and Transportation believed that the regulation
had not been invalidated. This is evidenced by their actions in response
to Lewis.
Following the Lewis decision, the government neither appealed the
decision nor pursued the issues left open on remand. 73 Instead, the gov-
ernment swiftly dismantled the mass transit regulations, without follow-
ing the requirements of Executive Order No. 12,250, the section 504
coordination authority. 74 The Department of Transportation's response
to Lewis was to promulgate an "interim final rule. '2 75 However, that
rule only purported to affect the mass transit provision of the Depart-
ment of Transportation section 504 regulation. The Department of
Transportation, of course, could have at that time promulgated a general
"burdens" exception to its entire regulation. It did not believe it was
compelled to do so, though, and its failure to take such action left its
NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, 657 F.2d 1322, 1331 (3d Cir. 1981) (Congress' "legis-
lative aim" in enacting § 504 was to "eliminat[e] discrimination.").
268. 655 F.2d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
269. The holding of Lewis and its progeny would appear to be negated by the Supreme
Court's construction of § 504 as requiring "meaningful access." Alexander, 469 U.S. at 301.
Moreover, to have a good understanding of the Lewis result, it is important to candidly recog-
nize that the Justice Department did not zealously defend the transportation regulation under
siege in that case. Indeed, having successfully defended the regulation in the district court, at
the oral argument of the appeal, the Justice Department abandoned the position it had adopted
in its briefs that the transportation regulation was required and conceded that "local option"
was not only a permissible choice, but also was a choice the government was considering
adopting, that is, the American Public Transit Association's position. Lewis, 655 F.2d at 1280
n.14. Thus, it is not completely surprising that the court ruled as it did, and it is somewhat
misleading for the Department of Justice to state in its section-by-section analysis that "[in
Lewis,] the Department had argued a position similar to that advocated by the commenters."
49 Fed. Reg. 35,725 (1984).
270. Lewis, 655 F.2d at 1278.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 1280 n.13.
273. See id. at 1280.
274. For an interesting exchange of memoranda between the Departments of Justice and
Transportation regarding this issue, see 127 CONG. Rnc. 19,288-291 (1981).
275. 46 Fed. Reg. 37,488 (1981).
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communication and architectural accessibility obligations intact. Since
the Department of Transportation regulation was modified solely in re-
sponse to Lewis, the Department of Transportation apparently did not
believe that Lewis required any other alteration.
Similarly, the Attorney General's response to Lewis was to suspend
the 1978 coordination regulation.276 However, he too only suspended the
mass transit provisions, leaving all of the communications and program
accessibility obligations of that rule intact; he apparently believed Lewis
required no other action. 7
The transportation cases are additionally distinguishable because
Congress all along has provided much less leeway and much more spe-
cific guidance to the Department of Transportation with regard to
section 504's mass transit requirements.27 Particularly revealing is Con-
gress' decision to overrule Department of Transportation's 1981 rescis-
sion of its uniform national mass transit accessibility standards. The
Department of Transportation had used the Lewis decision as its excuse
for that rescission. But in section 317(c) of the Surface Transportation
Assistance Act of 1982,279 Congress required the Department of Trans-
portation to again promulgate "minimum criteria" to enforce section
504. Congress implicitly rejected Lewis and expressly rejected the action
the agency took in response to that decision as "an abdication of Federal
responsibility for protecting handicapped persons from discrimination
and inadequate services. "280 Thus, whatever precedential value Lewis
276. Cf id. at 40,687.
277. Moreover, several federal agencies promulgated § 504 grantee regulations after Lewis,
but those agencies did not believe they were compelled by that decision to include any "bur-
dens" exceptions in their regulations. See supra note 95.
278. As early as the time of the debate on the McClure amendment in 1978, see supra note
117, this issue arose when that amendment's sponsor inserted into the Record two articles
concerning the high cost of making mass transit systems accessible to handicapped persons. In
a colloquy with Senator McClure, Senator Randolph, the Chairperson of the Subcommittee on
the Handicapped, pointed out that "as to the matter of the mass transit facilities for the Handi-
capped... is that a matter that is actually being considered in the Banking and Currency
Committee of the Senate?" 124 CONG. Rc. 30,579 (1978). The resulting legislation emanat-
ing from that committee provided that, for the purposes of § 504, municipalities with popula-
tions less than 50,000 were permitted to rely on paratransit services exclusively, municipalities
with populations of 50,000-750,000 were required to insure that 50% of new buses purchased
were fully accessible to handicapped persons, and municipalities with populations in excess of
750,000 were required to insure that 100% of new buses purchased were accessible. Depart-
ment of Transportation Appropriations Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 96-400, § 324, 94 Stat. 1681
(1980).
279. 49 U.S.C. § 1612(c) (1982).
280. 128 CONG. REC. S15,714 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1982) (statement of co-sponsor Sen.
Riegle). Co-sponsor Senator Cranston said the statute was necessary to remedy "a most unfor-
tunate situation [existing] in which the Department of Transportation's hands-off, local-op-
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and its progeny may have at one time enjoyed, those decisions have now
been overruled by an act of Congress.
C. The Case Law Requiring a Factual Basis for
Governmental Rulemaking
At their broadest, the dicta in Davis and Arline and the decision in
Lewis could in any event only authorize a "burdens" waiver if there were
a factual determination by the agency head of its necessity, especially
since the Secretary of HEW,28' the Attorney General,282 the Secretary of
Labor, 83 and numerous other agency heads,2 acting upon substantial
rulemaking records, determined that there was no factual necessity for a
general waiver of section 504's accessibility guarantee. In Bowen v.
American Hospital Association,85 the Supreme Court invalidated a regu-
lation issued to enforce section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act for this
reason. Justice Stevens grounded his opinion in Bowen upon the "axiom
of administrative law that an agency's explanation of the basis for its
decision must include 'a rational connection between the facts found and
the choice made.' "286
He then explained:
Agency deference has not come so far that we will uphold regu-
lations whenever it is possible to "conceive a basis" for admin-
istrative action. To the contrary, the "presumption of
regularity afforded an agency in fulfilling its statutory man-
tion, self-certification, no-monitoring, and no-criteria position is transforming the
antidiscrimination laws into hollow congressional symbols." Id. at S14,741 (daily ed. Dec. 14,
1982) (statement of Sen. Cranston). Regarding the original purposes of the Rehabilitation
Act, especially § 504, Senator Cranston stated his concern that "[n]ot only are we headed
toward affording handicapped and elderly persons third-class treatment, we are frustrating our
own efforts to rehabilitate people, help them get back into productive activities, be more in-
dependent, and get off of disability and welfare rolls." Id
Regarding the burdens of compliance, Senator Reigle asked his colleagues a series of
questions:
What will be the costs of continuing the present state of neglect? What will be the
costs of treating disabled and elderly individuals as third-class citizens, the costs of
precluding them from getting into the job market, the costs of forcing them to stay
on the disability and welfare rolls? These are surely very substantial costs-in both
human and economic terms. Those are the costs that we should be focusing upon and
trying our best to avoid.
Id. at S15,715 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1982) (statement of Sen. Reigle) (emphasis added).
281. See supra notes 74-89 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 150-58 and accompanying text.
283. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
285. 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986).
286. Id. at 2112 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
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date," is not equivalent to "the minimum rationality a statute
must bear in order to withstand analysis under the Due Process
Clause." Thus, the mere fact that there is "some rational basis
within the knowledge and experience of the [regulators],"
under which they "might have concluded" that the regulation
was necessary to discharge their statutorily-authorized mission,
will not suffice to validate agency decisionmaking. Our recog-
nition of Congress' need to vest administrative agencies with
ample power to assist in the dificult task of governing a vast
and complex industrial Nation carries with it the correlative
responsibility of the agency to explain the rationale and factual
basis for its decision, even though we show respect for the
agency's judgment in both.287
On the basis of these settled principles of construction, the Bowen
court determined that the promulgation of an interim regulation pursu-
ant to section 504 concerning the provision of medical care to handi-
capped infants was not valid since the government failed to provide an
adequate factual basis for the coverage of the rule.288 What obtains for
the coverage of a regulation must of course also obtain for any exception
to such coverage that may be available, such as the burdens exceptions
contained in the 1984 Department of Justice rule.
The burden on the agency in this context is different from what it
would be if the agency had been writing on a clean slate. "Accordingly,
an agency changing its course by rescinding a rule is obligated to supply
a reasoned analysis for the change .... 2 89
When there is such a reversal of direction as has occurred in the
Justice Department's 1984 rule, there is always a greater burden of expla-
nation created by the agency action. "[T]he presumption is against
changes in established policy that are not justified by the rulemaking rec-
ord."2 90 When "an agency has sharply changed its substantive policy,
then, judicial review of its action, while deferential, will involve a scru-
tiny of the reasons given by the agency for the change.... That reversal
itself constitutes a danger signal." '29 1 The rulemaker is required to give
sound reasons for the change.292
287. Bowen, 106 S. Ct. at 2112-13 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
288. Id. at 2123.
289. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983).
290. St. James Hosp. v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 1460 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983)).
291. NRDC v. EPA, 683 F.2d 752, 760 (3d Cir. 1982).
292. See Public Citizen v. Steed, 733 F.2d 93, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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Application of these principles to the 1984 Department of Justice
rule makes it very clear that there was no attempt by the Attorney Gen-
eral to factually justify its policy shift. As one court of appeals con-
cluded in analogous circumstances, "no conclusion [was] ever reached by
the [agency head] in this record that its resources are or would be over-
strained. 2 93 As in Bowen v. American HospitalAssociation, there was an
"absence of evidentiary support' 2 9 4 for the burdens provisions contained
in the 1984 rule. The Attorney General marshalled "no evidence" '295
that government agencies would be unduly burdened if required to pro-
vide handicapped participants meaningful access.2 96
D. The Case Law Prohibiting Administrative Waivers when Congress
intended Uniform National Standards
"[T]he intent expressed by supporters of the 1978 amendment in
floor debate, including its sponsor, Representative James M. Jeffords,"
the Attorney General stated in his analysis of the 1984 regulation, was
"that the Federal government should have the same section 504 obliga-
tions as recipients of Federal financial assistance. ' 297 This was not, how-
ever, the only intent of the amendment. The primary purpose appears to
have been the development of a "uniform and equitable national policy
293. Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 560 F.2d 529, 533
(2d Cir. 1977).
294. Bowen, 106 S. Ct. at 2113 n.14.
295. Id. at 2115.
296. Since the Attorney General has reversed directions in his 1984 construction of § 504,
that rule does not present a situation where an agency's "longstanding" interpretation deserves
deference. Cf NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974); Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969); Zemmel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 11-12, rehg denied, 382
U.S. 873 (1965); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-18, reh'g denied, 380 U.S. 989 (1965); Nor-
wegian Nitrogen Products v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933). It has long been settled
law that a primary factor governing the deference to be given a rule in a particular case is "its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements." Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134,
140 (1944).
As the Supreme Court emphasized in State Farm, when an agency follows a "settled
course," it signals that it is carrying out the congressional mandate, and that by adhering to
the settled path it best carries out congressional policy. 463 U.S. at 41 (quoting Atchinson,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 807 (1973)). Accord United
States v. Clark, 454 U.S. 555, 565 (1982); United States v. NASD, 422 U.S. 694, 718-19
(1975); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 237 (1974); Traficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins., 409
U.S. 205, 210 (1972). The weight to be assigned to an agency's rule may be somewhat "dissi-
pated by the agency's presentation... of... contrary construction[s]." Cerro Metal Prod. v.
Marshall, 620 F.2d 964, 981 (3d Cir. 1980). Of course, agencies sometimes make mistakes and
disavow prior positions, but a call for deference to administrative expertise for regulatory pro-
visions as egregiously inconsistent as those of the Department of Justice's 1984 rule has a
rather hollow ring.
297. 49 Fed. Reg. 35,725 (1984).
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for eliminating discrimination. 298
This issue was addressed by the Supreme Court in El. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Train.299 There, the appellate court had ruled that
"[p]rovisions for variances, modifications, and exceptions are appropriate
to the regulatory process." 3"
Justice Stevens, in a unanimous opinion reversing the lower court,
stated that "[t]he question.., is not what a court thinks is generally
appropriate to the regulatory process; it is what Congress intended for
these regulations."3" The legislation in question in DuPont, like section
504, contained "no statutory provision for variances.""3 2 When faced
with such a statute, the Court ruled, an agency's decision to add "a vari-
ance provision would be inappropriate in a standard that was intended to
insure national uniformity."3 °3
The DuPont reasoning appears to be fully applicable to section 504
administrative regulations. Each federal agency is ultimately responsible
for promulgating its own section 504 regulation and for enforcing it.
Eventually, there will be over ninety agency rules. Each, presumably,
would follow the Justice Department's lead with a standardless waiver
provision. Mid-level agency managers, given the availability of the "bur-
dens" exception, may be tempted to take the opportunity to use this ex-
ception when any visible inconvenience appears. Disabled persons
cannot be comforted by the assurance that "undue burdens" decisions
are "to be made by the Attorney General or his designee[s]." 3' Assum-
ing other agencies also limit the number of final "undue burdens" deci-
sion makers, and that the decision makers actually scrutinize all of the
298. E.g., 124 CONG. REc. 13,603 (1978) (statement of Rep. Jeffords); see also id. at 13,901
(statement of Rep. Jeffords).
299. 430 U.S. 112 (1977).
300. 541 F.2d 1018, 1028 (4th Cir. 1976), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 430 U.S. 112
(1977).
301. 430 U.S. at 138 (emphasis in original).
302. Id. It is well-settled that "[w]hen Congress has intended that an agency engage in
cost-benefit analysis, it has clearly indicated such intent on the face of the statute." American
Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 510 (1981) (emphasis added). On the face
of § 504, there is no limitation other than the requirement that a handicapped person must be
"otherwise qualified." The reason for the absence of such a limitation is plain from the legisla-
tive history: Congress already balanced factors and concluded that the harms of exclusion
outweighed the burdens of compliance. The HEW regulation respected that intent while per-
mitting grantees flexibility in choosing their methods of complying. As the legislative history
shows, Congress "ranked other values higher than efficiency" in the course of its adoption of
§ 504. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983). Congress has denominated "meaningful
access" as the right involved here and the right that "must be provided." Alexander v.
Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301-02 (1985).
303. 430 U.S. at 138 (emphasis added).
304. 49 Fed. Reg. 35,730 (1984).
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entreaties that arrive in Washington from their regional offices, that still
would permit hundreds of different persons making decisions without the
benefit of any standard. It takes little imagination to envision the chaos
that could easily result.
When HEW, then the coordinating authority, formulated its regula-
tion, it was well-aware of the importance of setting forth in its rule "spe-
cific obligations."305 Similarly, Senator Cranston expressed his concern
to the HEW Secretary on the eve of the regulation's issuance that "waiv-
ers and exceptions.., can serve only to generate paperwork and litiga-
tion at the expense of investigation, compliance and enforcement
activities."30 6
IV. CONCLUSION
The legislative history to section 504 appears to leave little doubt
that the Congress intended to codify-or, at a minimum, to approve-a
flexible standard that would permit "burdens" to be taken into account.
However, Congress desired that the costs of compliance with section 504
would not outweigh the right to meaningful access to federal and feder-
ally assisted programs.
Although scattered judicial dicta would appear to support a broader
"burdens" defense to the duty to provide disabled people meaningful ac-
cess to federal and federally assisted programs, the better view-and one
adopted by the Secretary of HEW, which successfully reconciles the
cases and the competing interests involved and honors the legislative his-
tory of section 504-is that the burdens of providing accessibility can be
considered so long as they are not used to nullify the right of disabled
people to meaningful access.
305. 1976 Rehabilitation of the Handicapped Programs, supra note 106, at 1491 (testimony
of Martin Gerry, Director of HEW's Office for Civil Rights).
306. 123 CONG. REC. 12,410 (1977) (statement of Sen. Cranston); see id. at 14,133-34
(statement of Sen. Koch) (noting that following the issuance of the regulation the Secretary
had heeded his earlier advice); see also 1977 Section 504 Implementation Hearings, supra note
84, at 292 (testimony of David Tatel, Director of HEW's Office for Civil Rights). The lack of
uniformity might be exacerbated because the Attorney General stated in his Preamble to the
1984 regulation that he intends to apply the new standard to grantees as well without modify-
ing the grantee regulation. 49 Fed. Reg. 35,725 (1984). Such a policy might be especially
unfair to the numerous grantees who, for ten years now, have been complying, voluntarily,
with the HEW mandate. Moreover, in an amicus brief to the Supreme Court, the Department
of Justice has explained that monitoring the policies of grantees in such a manner would re-
quire a "serious intrusion into the affairs" of federal grantees. Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae at 30, University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390 (1981). For example,
grantees might be required to open their financial records to government civil rights compli-
ance officers. Such a requirement could further "creat[e] a lack of uniformity in the adminis-
tration of Section 504 .... ." Id.
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